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CALIFORNIA’S DATABASE BREACH NOTIFICATION SECURITY ACT: 
THE FIRST STATE BREACH NOTIFICATION LAW IS NOT YET
A SUITABLE TEMPLATE FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY THEFT LEGISLATION
BY: TIMOTHY H. SKINNER*
I.  INTRODUCTION
• In March 2003, hackers stole records that included the names, social security numbers, 
addresses and e-mail addresses of 55,000 students and faculty from the University of 
Texas at Austin.1
• In February 2003, a burglar stole a computer from Triwest Healthcare Association that 
held the social security numbers and health records of 500,000 employees of the U.S. 
Department of Defense.2  
• In February 2003, a data processing center in Nebraska reported that eight million credit 
card numbers were stolen from its servers.3
• In January 2003, the University of Kansas confirmed that the records of 1,400 
international students were removed from its online system.4  
• In January 2003, a Canadian insurance company warned 180,000 of its clients that their 
personal information (including account details, beneficiaries, social insurance numbers, 
pension fund values, and mothers’ maiden names) was at risk because the insurance 
company’s computer services provider, IBM Information Systems Management, reported 
that a hard drive that contained customer information was missing.5
• In April 2002, hackers broke into a California state database and accessed names, social 
security numbers, and payroll information regarding 265,000 state employees.6
• In December 2002, laptops and hard drives were stolen from Tri West Health Care which 
contained the names, addresses, telephone numbers, birth dates and social security 
numbers of 562,000 members of the military and their dependents.7
{1} Attacks on poorly-secured information systems containing personal information are nearing 
epidemic proportion.  Hardly a month passes without a news story regarding a security breach 
that exposed hundreds or thousands of data subjects’ personal information.   As dependence on 
e-Commerce continues to expand, personal information stolen from poorly secured systems is 
becoming a multi-billion dollar industry.   
{2} Since the birth of the Internet, legislative efforts have focused mainly on punishing the 
offenders, generally referred to as “hackers,” rather than improving the quality of system 
security.8  This emphasis originated with the legislative view that hackers with idle time on 
their hands were the cause of the problem and that the exploitation of vulnerabilities in 
organizations’ computer systems was merely the effect.  In recent years, however, the paradigm 
has begun to shift.  Federal and state legislatures are beginning to view poor system security as 
the cause of private information exposure and the malevolent behavior of hackers as the effect 
of poor system security.  As this new paradigm is shifting the onus from the hackers to those 
hacked, the focus of information security is shifting from criminal law to civil law. 
{3} This shift is reflected in recent California legislation: the Database Breach Notification 
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Security Act (“SB 1386”).9  For the first time, a legislature shattered the aging paradigm 
and at least implicitly, focused on a first line of defense:  securing the systems that store 
personal information.10   SB 1386 is unique in that it requires California state government 
agencies, organizations, and persons that do business in California (collectively referred to as 
“organizations” herein) to promptly notify California “residents” when they have a reasonable 
belief that a system breach occurred which possibly exposed data subjects’ personal information 
to third parties.11  Although SB 1386 has many notable deficiencies, it does provide a good 
starting point for addressing the issue of security breach notification and maintains a good 
balance between the interests of corporations and their data subjects.12 
{4} It is important to understand the background and circumstances that led to the enactment of 
SB 1386 before analyzing its provisions and impact.  Part II of this article will focus on computer 
security breaches and the resulting rise in identity theft that caused the California legislature 
to pass this bill.  Part III will discuss the creation of SB 1386 and its strengths and weaknesses.  
Part IV will study efforts to require breach notification at the federal level.  Part V will address 
the curative or protective measures that should be taken by:  (1) organizations wishing to 
avoid a breach; and (2) individuals whose personal information was disclosed as a result of a 
security breach.   Part VI will conclude by finding that using SB 1386 as the template for federal 
legislation would be unwise, unless the issues discussed herein are addressed. 
II.  SECURITY BREACHES AND THE RISE OF IDENTITY THEFT
A.  Security Breaches
{5} According to one online security firm, the average U.S. company’s computer security is 
attacked by intruders thirty times per week.13  These intrusions are known as security breaches.  
What constitutes a security breach will vary depending on the source of the definition.  The most 
generic definition of security breach is a successful attack on a computer system’s security 
controls in order to penetrate the system to acquire or corrupt information on the system, thus 
disrupting the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the information on the system.
{6} Security breaches can come from outside an organization – for example, via hackers trying 
to break into the system.  Breaches may also come from inside, typically from disgruntled 
employees, embezzlers, or even system administrators who have viewed information they are 
not authorized to access.14  To date, most breaches come from within organizations.  Employees 
either exploit their legitimate access to data or exceed their authority to view data otherwise 
restricted by company policy.  There is evidence, however, that this trend is changing.15  
{7} A large part of the problem is that computer security is not viewed as a priority by many 
organizations.  More importantly, it is not viewed as a priority by the people who authorize 
funding of security initiatives within organizations. There is not a strong organizational culture 
of data security throughout many organizations, even though they maintain or have access to 
the personal data of millions of Americans.  This is due in part to the relative ‘newness’ of the 
electronic age, but . . . [is] more attributable to the absence of law and policy that would require 
organizations to take seriously the issues of data security and policy. 16  
For example, although eighty-percent of the companies participating in one study reported that 
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they had a security policy in place, only forty-seven percent said that this policy was embraced 
by line and functional leaders.17  
{8} There are commonly two types of security breach victims.18  The first is the person or 
organization that suffers from the breach and the second is the data subject whose personal 
information is contained on the system that was attacked.  Generally, the data subject is a 
consumer who provided information to a business in order to purchase goods or obtain some 
other service, but might also be an employee whose personal information was provided to an 
employer to secure employment or employee benefits, or a patient at a hospital or doctor’s 
office, or even a law firm’s client.  
{9} As noted above, the purpose of most malevolent breaches is to gain access to information.  
Sometimes breaches are, however, designed to gain an unfair advantage in the marketplace.  
Other times, and with growing frequency, the purpose of security breaches is to access personal 
information to commit identity theft.
B.  The Rise of Identity Theft
{10} Identity theft is the taking of another person’s social security number, date of birth, or other 
personal information for the purpose of assuming the data subject’s identity in order to secure 
goods and services on the data subject’s accounts.19  Identity thieves may also use the victim’s 
information to secure employment or apply for government services.20  Credit reporting agencies 
reported a rise in identity theft cases from 35,235 in 1992 to 522,922 in 1997.21   
{11} The FTC reported that identity theft complaints nearly doubled between 2001 and 2002.22  
In 2002, the FTC reported receiving 218,714 reports of possible or actual identity theft.23  The 
U.S. Department of Justice estimates that as many as 700,000 U.S. consumers may fall prey 
to identity theft each year.24  These complaints account for forty-three percent of the consumer 
fraud complaints filed.25  A nationwide study conducted in 2002 revealed that one in twenty 
people was a victim of identity theft.26  According to the U.S. Treasury, the cost of this illegal 
conduct is between two and three billion dollars per year for credit cards alone.27  
{12} Varying estimates have been given for the amount of “out of pocket” expenses that afflict 
the average victim of identity theft.28  The range is anywhere from $800.00 to $1,100.00.29  
The following additional identity theft damages have been noted: personal time spent fixing 
problems with personal accounts, loss of productivity, emotional distress, higher mortgage 
and interest rates, lack of purchasing power, and loss of vacation time spent dealing with theft 
issues.30  The personal time the average victim spends attempting to restore his identity31 is 175 
hours.32  
 
{13} Victims usually do not discover that someone has stolen their identity until fourteen months 
after the information is acquired.33  Once discovered, it can take years to clear up identity 
theft issues.34    Part of the problem is that merchants rarely tell customers about breaches 
voluntarily.35  Instead, they wait for customers to complain about unauthorized activities. 36  The 
result of businesses withholding information from the public is that the government is less 
equipped to get an overall understanding of where resources should be applied, thus making 
the nation more vulnerable to cyber-attacks.37  Moreover, if organizations do not report breaches 
to law enforcement authorities, the hackers remain in obscurity, free to act with impunity.  In an 
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effort to curb computer security breaches and to empower victims of identity theft, the State of 
California enacted the first state computer security breach notification legislation in the United 
States.
III.  THE CREATION OF AND REACTION TO SB 1386
{14} SB 1386 has become a hot topic in security and business circles nationwide.38  One author 
believes that because of California’s size and leading role in the high-tech industry, SB 1386 
“could create a de facto national disclosure policy” even absent the passage of federal legislation 
on the subject.39   Others have noted that this law could have a global effect.40  In order to 
understand the circumstances that led to the passage of this law, it is important to understand its 
history.
A.  History of SB 1386
{15} On April 2, 2002, the Stephen P. Teale Data Center (“Data Center”), a state-operated data 
storage facility41 in California, was breached by an unknown attacker.42  The Data Center houses 
social security numbers, first and middle initials, last names, and payroll deduction amounts 
on full and part-time California state employees.43  The personal information of all 265,000 
state employees was potentially exposed during the breach.44  Although the Data Center breach 
occurred on April 5, 2002, it was not discovered until May 7, 2002, and employees were not 
notified until May 21, 2002.45   The breach was discovered during routine maintenance on the 
system on May 7.46  According to Kathleen Connell, the Controller for the State of California, the 
Controller’s Office then directed the Data Center to “disconnect” the computer that had been 
breached.47  At that point, the Controller’s Office’s representative on the Sacramento Valley Hi 
Tech Crime Task Force was notified of the breach.48  The Task Force then took control of the 
criminal investigation.49  The Task Force then advised the Data Center to determine whether any 
information was removed.50  The Task Force also told the Data Center not to report the breach 
during the investigation.51  
{16} A spokesman for the Governor of California suggested shortly after the breach that the 
state did everything it could to prevent the break-in.52  During the investigation, however, it 
was discovered that the server that was breached sat outside the Data Center’s firewall.53  No 
explanation was given for this anomaly.  Shortly after the incident, state officials also reported 
concern over the ease with which the hackers accessed the system.54  The Data Center operators 
admitted they actually employed few of the existing Data Center security procedures in place to 
protect the system.55  
{17} Furthermore, after the attack, conflicting information was reported regarding the regular 
maintenance of patches at the Data Center.56  Early reports stated that patches57 that should 
have been installed at the Data Center prior to the incident were not operating.58  A California 
Controller’s Office representative indicated, however, that the Data Center applied a required 
patch to one of two servers that held state employee payroll deduction information, but not the 
one that was breached.59  This representative admitted that if the patch had been installed on 
both servers, “that attack would not have been successful.”60
{18} The Data Center director was less than reassuring on the issue of whether personal 
information had been viewed, downloaded or printed during the attack.  He suggested that 
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in order to actually steal, as opposed to merely viewing information, the hacker would need 
to penetrate a series of password-protected areas.61  Of course, he could not say for certain 
whether this was accomplished.62  In subsequent testimony before a California State Senate 
subcommittee, the director was quoted as saying “I don’t think we will ever be one-hundred 
percent sure that the data has not been compromised.”63  Despite this lack of certainty, the 
director also reportedly stated that there was no evidence that the hacker had downloaded, 
printed or even accessed the state workers’ personal information.64   It is more likely, however, 
that the Data Center simply had no information to prove or disprove this theory.65  Although 
it could not be directly tied to this particular breach, at least one state employee reported 
suspicious activities that indicated the strong possibility of identity theft following the breach.66
{19} Shortly after the Data Center breach, California State Senator Steve Peace announced that 
he would be delving into these issues during a June 12, 2002, hearing designed to start the 
process for preventing further attacks.67  Shortly thereafter, Senator Peace reworked pre-existing 
bill SB 1386 to address the Data Center issues.68  The principle features of the final version SB 
1386 as enacted are as follows:
 
• Businesses, California state government agencies, and individuals who conduct 
business in California or own or license computerized personal information are 
required to disclose “any breach of the security of [California residents’]. . . data. . . 
following discovery or notification of the breach.”69 
• “Breach of the security of the system70 means the unauthorized acquisition of 
computerized data that compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of 
personal information” on the system.71 The breach does not need to be reported 
unless the personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, 
acquired by an unauthorized person.”72 
• If an employee or agent acquires the information in good faith “for the purposes 
of the agency” and the information is not disclosed further, it does not constitute 
a breach.73
• Personal information is an individual’s first name or first initial and last name in 
combination with a(n): (1) social security number;74 (2) California driver’s license 
or California Identification Card number; and/or (3)  account number, credit or 
debit card number, in combination with the security or access code or password 
that would allow access to the account. 75   Notice of breaches of publicly available 
information alone is not required.76
• The disclosure must be “expedient” and made “without unreasonable delay.”77
• If a California resident is harmed by the agency’s failure to give notice as required 
by the Act, s/he may bring a civil suit for damages, injunctive relief and any other 
relief allowed by law. 78
• Notice of the breach need not be given right away if measures are being taken 
to determine the scope of the breach and “restore reasonable integrity to the 
system.”79
• Notice of the breach need not be given right away if the delay is “consistent with 
the legitimate needs of law enforcement.”  Once law enforcement determines 
that notification will not “compromise” the investigation, notice must be given.80
• Notice, as defined by SB 1386, is any of the following:  written, electronic, 
or substitute notice.81  Substitute notice is only appropriate when written or 
electronic notice would cost in excess of $250,000.00 or the party does not have 
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enough information to do the other forms of notice.82  
• If the personal information subject to the breach was “encrypted,” no notification is 
required.83
• The Act was effective July 1, 2003.84
B.  Pros and Cons of Notice
{20} The notification provision is the heart of SB 1386.85  On the surface, the benefits of notice 
appear to be obvious.  Beth Givens, Director of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse in San Diego, 
stated that the key to preventing identity theft is early detection.  According to Givens, “the earlier 
you know, the easier it is for you to stop the damage.”86  The more time that passes following a 
breach, the lower the chance that the information will be used,87 because criminals who possess 
this type of information tend to act quickly.88  Consumers who receive early notice of such 
breaches can cancel their credit cards and contact credit bureaus in order to prevent thieves from 
opening bogus accounts.89
{21} Some argue, however, that data subjects gain no real advantage by receiving early notice 
of a breach.90  In effect, public notice of the breach gives hackers the notoriety they crave.91  
Moreover, credit card companies suggest that when credit card numbers are acquired during 
a breach, consumers do not need to know because they are protected by “zero liability” or “no 
fault” consumer protection.92  This “protection,” however, can be illusory, mainly because many 
credit card companies require their cardholders to review their statements for unauthorized 
transactions.  If the cardholders do not catch the transactions within a reasonable time period, 
the credit card companies may counter that the cardholders have been grossly negligent in 
reviewing their bills.93   If cardholders know that there have been breaches with respect to their 
credit information, at least they can monitor their billing statements with jaundiced eyes.  They 
may also decide to cancel their credit cards or request new credit cards and numbers in order to 
avoid the possibility that they might inadvertently overlook fraudulent transactions.  If customers 
are not given this option and they fail to notice fraudulent transactions, their SB 1386 or common 
law complaints against the credit card companies for improper security or failure to provide 
notice may be countered with claims of comparative negligence or breach of contract.  
{22} Whatever the strength of zero liability policies may be, the California Senate did not agree 
with this argument.  As noted in the comments from the June 18, 2002 hearing of the Assembly 
Committee on Judiciary:
All too often events of this sort go completely unreported.  How can this 
be?  The embarrassment of disclosure that a company or agency was 
“hacked,” or the fear of lost business based upon shoddy information 
security practices being disclosed overrides the need to inform the affected 
persons.  In other instances, credit card issuers, telephone companies and 
internet service providers, along with state and local officials “handle” the 
access of consumer’s personal and financial information by unauthorized 
persons internally, often absorbing the losses caused by fraud as a matter of 
“customer service” without ever informing the customer of the unauthorized 
use of his/her account.94
{23} The California Senate was not only concerned with the effect a particular loss of credit 
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information might have on consumers in their contractual relationship with their credit card 
companies, but also with empowering cardholders and other data subjects to give them a voice 
in the decision-making process once their personal information is stolen.
C.  Scope of the Notice Provision 
{24} The scope of the notice provision places organizations in a bind because they must decide 
whether to give the minimum notice required by law or go beyond the express requirements.  
For example, analysts have warned that relying on the strict requirements of SB 1386 and 
merely notifying California customers of breaches is not advisable.95  Notifying only Californians 
may not only subject the organization to criticism,96 but businesses may simply find it easier 
to notify everyone rather than merely notifying California residents.97  The bottom line is that 
“[c]ompanies do not want to get to the point of notification.”98  “Therefore, they have powerful 
incentive to secure data from the beginning.”99  
{25} Due to the complex nature of online transactions, it will be difficult to determine who must 
provide notice under SB 1386.  This issue arises because data travels through intermediaries 
during online transactions.100  It is, therefore, difficult to determine whether the sender’s or 
recipient’s information has been breached.  SB 1386 leaves these questions unanswered.
{26} Once a breach has occurred and notice is required, an organization is immediately faced 
with the daunting task of assessing whether any of the data subjects whose information was 
potentially exposed were residents of California.
D.  Conducting Business in California and Storing Information on its Residents
{27} Virtually every online merchant sells its products to California residents.101  In accordance 
with the Act, storing confidential information pertaining to a single California resident on a 
single computer will require compliance.102  No physical office or other property in California 
is required.103  According to Scott Pink, Deputy Chair of the American Bar Association’s 
Cybersecurity Task Force, “[i]f you are selling products or providing services to residents of 
California, it would probably be determined that you’re conducting business in California under 
this law.”104  If a company maintains personal information on a potential customer, former 
customer, or other California resident on its system, then it must comply.105  
{28} SB 1386 fails to establish criteria for determining whether data subjects whose personal 
information is involved in a suspected breach are residents of California.106  Opponents of the 
law have noted that it is virtually impossible to determine which persons in a database are 
residents of California, mainly because the database owners often collect no information from 
the users that would allow this assessment to take place.107  Even where residency information 
is obtained during a transaction, a customer who is a California resident at the time of the 
transaction may cease to be a resident at the time the breach occurs.  The opposite is also 
true: a customer who is a non-California resident at the time of the transaction could become 
a California resident before the breach without the company’s knowledge.108  For this reason, 
many companies have legitimately criticized the bill for failing to provide a method by which 
a database owner can determine whether a data subject is a California resident,109 especially 
where only e-mail or IP addresses were collected at the time of the transaction.110
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{29} Organizations are uncertain whether the courts will employ the legal definition of “resident” 
used for establishing venue.  It is also uncertain whether California courts will require businesses 
to regularly contact data subjects to update information regarding their residency.  Businesses 
that rely solely on data received at the point at which they originally gathered information from 
the subject could find themselves at risk of civil suit under SB 1386.  From a privacy perspective, 
it is ironic that the law could actually require that businesses insist on collecting and storing more 
information regarding California data subjects at the time of a transaction than ever before.111  
{30} Organizations should update their customer contact information on a regular basis to avoid 
using SB 1386’s public notice procedures.112   This suggestion originates from the idea that 
a company is better advised to notify the individual customers affected rather than making a 
public announcement, because such an announcement will easily reach unaffected and potential 
customers as well.  Although such an approach does not guarantee that the matter will not be 
exposed to the general public anyway, it may limit the scope of the unpleasant advertisement.
{31} Organizations must also consider the liability implications of only notifying California 
residents to the exclusion of all other data subjects.113  One law firm has recommended that 
companies notify every potentially affected data subject in the United States in the event 
of a breach.114  Segregating California residents for notice of breaches could create liability 
implications with respect to non-Californians who fail to also receive notice.115   
E.  Vagueness of Language Used
{32} Perhaps the most maligned aspect of the bill is its use of undefined terms.  “Modern 
legislators simply do not understand [technology],” and this lack of understanding causes them 
to create vague legislation at the request of lobbyists and public interest groups.116  Assailed as a 
byproduct of this problem, SB 1386’s lack of definitions for key terms will make compliance for 
organizations and enforcement for the courts very difficult.  
1.  “Reasonable Belief” that “Acquisition” of Data Has Occurred
{33} As noted above, SB 1386 requires notification of data subjects once an organization has 
a reasonable belief that data acquisition has occurred.  Thus, the law does not require actual 
proof that personal information has been compromised before notice is required.  In other words, 
SB 1386 is not simply limited to situations where an organization knows a California resident’s 
personal information has been acquired without authorization.  Instead, the law expands 
the notice requirement to encompass situations where it is “reasonably believed” that such 
information has been acquired.117  The “reasonably believed” language, therefore, requires notice 
to California residents even if an organization merely “suspects” the unauthorized acquisition of 
information.118  Because reasonable belief that an acquisition has occurred is all that is required, 
mere access to data, not actual theft or use119 of the information will trigger the statute’s costly 
notice provision.120  
{34} The Investment Company Institute (ICI), a coalition that represents the mutual fund industry, 
argued during the California Senate legislative proceedings for SB 1386 that this provision will 
not only be expensive for organizations to implement,121 but it will unnecessarily alarm citizens 
who receive notice.122  Therefore, the practical result of this bill may be a rash of false alarms 
delivered via the notice required by this law, even though no actual acquisition of customer 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Fall 2003- Volume X, Issue 1
TIMOTHY H. SKINNER- CALIFORNIA’S DATABASE BREACH NOTIFICATION SECURITY ACT
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Fall 2003- Volume X, Issue 1
TIMOTHY H. SKINNER- CALIFORNIA’S DATABASE BREACH NOTIFICATION SECURITY ACT
information has occurred.123  This may result in the erosion of consumer confidence in Internet 
transactions124 and cause companies to lose customers.125  A barrage of notices warning 
consumers of security breaches might also eventually desensitize consumers and cause them 
to ignore the notices.126  On the other hand, notification requirements may cause companies to 
improve information security, thus increasing consumer confidence.127
{35} Moreover, many organizations may not know that there has been a breach until employees 
start receiving bills or calls for charges they did not incur.128  This occurs, in part, because it is 
difficult to prove that confidential data was not stolen once a computer system is breached.129  
This situation occurs most often with systems that either lack intrusion detection capability130 
or have logging capabilities that are not implemented or are improperly configured.  It may also 
happen simply because a company lacks security measures that would allow any monitoring of 
their systems.  Whatever the monitoring capability of a particular system may be, the Act itself 
is silent on the method that must be used to discover breaches.131  Therefore, it is conceivable 
that under SB 1386, a company might take the position that it will take no affirmative action to 
discover that a breach has occurred, thus “keeping itself in the dark” in order to delay or avoid 
the expense and embarrassment of notice.132  Although SB 1386 itself may not specifically 
require that companies employ a monitoring system to discover breaches, this does not mean 
that such an obligation would not be imposed by a court under contract or tort theories.133  It is, 
therefore, the combination of SB 1386 and the prospect of tort and contract liability that results 
in the inescapable conclusion that employing tools to deter or detect  security breaches is an 
implicit requirement of SB 1386.
{36} Other opponents of the terms “reasonably believed” and “acquired” cite the fact that it is 
difficult to discern what would constitute knowledge of a breach.134  Because of this vagueness, 
it would, therefore, be plausible for a court interpreting SB 1386 to hold that any semblance 
of unauthorized activity triggers the disclosure requirements, especially where an organization 
does not employ adequate logging or intrusion detection systems to prove otherwise.135  It is 
more likely, however, that organizations will be required to notify consumers at the point where 
they know the intruder has accessed personal information, thus putting himself in a position to 
copy, download or print it.  Organizations that employ intrusion detection software and logging 
devices may be able to determine that an intruder has not accessed personal information, thus 
saving themselves the cost and humiliation of notification.  Therefore, organizations which 
do not employ intrusion detection and other forensic tools which allow tracing of a hacker’s 
movements before and after the system is penetrated may actually find themselves giving 
notice to California residents more often than those who have this tracing capability. 
{37} As SB 1386 made its way through the legislative process, many businesses lobbied for 
language that would require proof of actual acquisition before notice is required.  The Senate 
clearly intended to create a proactive bill that empowers data subjects before their stolen 
data is exploited.  Proof of an actual acquisition, as opposed to a reasonable belief that data 
was acquired, would necessarily require harm to a data subject before the notice provision is 
triggered.  After all, if actual acquisition were the standard, the only real proof of acquisition 
would be a case of identity theft involving a data subject whose information was obtained during 
the breach.136  The authors of SB 1386, however, intended to be proactive in stopping identity 
theft.  Therefore, the California Senate did not allow organizations to wait until a data subject 
was actually harmed before requiring notification.  
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{38} It is also possible that the California Senate considered the limits of current technology in 
assessing the point at which notice must be given.  If the California Senate required “acquisition” 
rather than mere access before notification is required, technology would have to exist to prove 
this distinction.  It would also render SB 1386 meaningless unless an organization has intrusion 
detection software sophisticated enough to determine when or if information was actually 
downloaded or copied.137  Because current intrusion detection software can only determine when 
information has been accessed, reasonable belief of acquisition must necessarily occur once an 
organization knows that access has occurred.  Even if intrusion detection software could show 
that information was not accessed and downloaded, it is impossible to say with any certainty that 
the hacker did not simply write down the accessed information with an old-fashioned pen and 
paper.138
{39} This issue is further complicated when the attack is committed by gaining access to, and 
subsequently employing, a legitimate user’s ID and authentication.  This type of breach is virtually 
impossible to detect regardless of the strength of the system’s security, because many intrusion 
detection software packages are designed only to detect anomalies, not what appears to be 
normal user behavior.139  The only way to detect such an intrusion is if the unauthorized user 
exceeds the scope of authority granted to the legitimate user by the system administrator.140  
When a legitimate user’s access information is employed, provided that the user’s authorization 
is not exceeded, an organization may never know that a breach has occurred until data subjects 
start experiencing identity theft problems.141
2.  Why Only Electronic and Not Paper Records?
{40} As noted above, the definition of breach, which triggers the notice requirement, only 
applies to “the unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security, 
confidentiality, or integrity of personal information” on the system.142  From the perspective 
of privacy advocates, the most frustrating thing about SB 1386 is the fact that it is limited to 
electronic breaches, even though theft of papers records carries the same potential for identity 
theft.143   For example, in 2002, Ligand Pharmaceuticals in San Diego settled a negligence suit 
with employees whose identities were stolen when it failed to protect personal information 
contained in paper records.144  The records in question came from a company acquired by 
Ligand.145  The files stolen contained social security numbers, names, birth dates and other data.  
A lab worker who discovered documents in boxes in a storage closet stole the information.146  The 
employee then used the data to rent apartments, to open cellular phone accounts and twenty-five 
credit card accounts to which $100,000 in goods were charged.147   Ligand reportedly settled with 
the affected employees out of court for a “significant six-figure amount.”148  This theft occurred 
despite the fact that Ligand had very strict policies for safeguarding its records.149
{41} Even if the records in the Ligand files contained information pertaining to a California 
resident, and even if the theft had occurred after July 1, 2003, SB 1386 would not have required 
Ligand to notify customers of this breach of its physical (as opposed to its electronic) security.150  
Although some argue that electronic data can be more easily transmitted in large quantities and, 
therefore, requires faster notice to stop the rapid spread of information, this argument will be of 
little help to the individual California resident whose data is stolen from paper records.  Breach 
notification laws should address breaches of paper as well as of electronic records.  
 3. Conflicting Laws
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{42} As SB 1386 made its way through the legislative process, opponents also criticized the bill 
because of its potential to conflict with federal law.  One opponent noted that with the myriad 
of potentially conflicting federal and state laws facing corporations, they are “bewildered to 
comply with what appears to be several moving targets.”151  The president of the Software and 
Information Industry Association (SIIA), Ken Wasch, also suggested that compliance under SB 
1386 would, “in all likelihood, conflict with the requirements of Federal laws such as Gramm-
Leach-Bliley and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), potentially subjecting 
companies to conflicting liability requirements.”152  It has also been suggested that federal laws, 
such as the Early Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), may preempt SB 1386 to the extent 
it is applies to ERISA plans and group or multi-employer health plans.153  
{43} Furthermore, it has been argued that the bill reflects an attempt to regulate interstate 
commerce by forcing companies outside of California to comply with its notice requirements 
when they store California residents’ information.  The power to regulate interstate commerce is 
reserved to the federal government under Article 8, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution.154
F.  Notice Exemptions
 1.  Encryption 
{44} The most often discussed and questioned feature of SB 1386 is what has been referred to 
as the encryption “exemption.”  The authors of SB 1386 exempted encrypted data from the bill’s 
definition of breach.  In discussing this purported safe harbor, one storage security vendor Vice 
President stated that the law “is scary for any company.  But if you’re encrypted, you don’t have 
to abide.”155  However, a close examination of the encryption exemption creates more questions 
than it answers.  It would be more accurate to say that encryption may, but does not necessarily, 
result in exemption from the Act’s notification requirements.156  
{45} The main source of confusion is the fact that SB 1386 does not define the strength or 
level of the encryption that will exempt an organization from SB 1386’s notice requirements.157  
The law does not expressly state that the encryption needs to be strong158 or even reasonable.  
Furthermore, the California Senate did not expressly require a level of encryption similar to that 
currently used in any particular area of the economy.159  For example, the authors could have 
required organizations affected by the bill to employ the encryption standard used by the federal 
government to protect sensitive information.160  This omitted definition may cause organizations 
to feel more secure with their level of encryption than they should.  It also might cause them to 
invest161 in encryption technology that exceeds their needs and reduces system efficiency.
{46} Part of the problem with SB 1386 is that its authors appear to equate “encryption” with 
“security.”   Encryption, however, is not supposed to be the primary source of security.162  It is 
designed to supplement an overall risk-based program.163  It is part of the solution, not the 
solution.  When considering encryption as part of a security program, a broad selection of 
encryption devices are available, ranging from those that are relatively easy to break to those 
that are virtually impossible to bypass with current technology.164  Most encryption is done 
when transmitting data.165  Secure Socket Layer166 (SSL) is the technology most commonly 
employed to encrypt information when transferring it between computers over the internet.167  
Attacks on the data can, however, occur both before and after transitory encryption takes 
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place.168  Although the type of encryption envisioned by SB 1386 is not stated, the bill must 
necessarily be referring to encrypting data as it rests on the system as well as encrypting it 
during transmission.169   Encryption of data while at rest in the database is a far less common 
security method.170  The problem is that encrypting data at rest leads to a serious “degradation of 
service.”171  It simply is not possible or practical to encrypt all data all the time.”172  
{47} SB 1386 is also flawed because the encryption provision reflects a lack of understanding of 
technology.173  By failing to define encryption, the California Senate created future difficulty for 
organizations hoping to prove that they have encrypted their data and are therefore entitled to 
exemption from SB 1386’s notice requirements.  Once the data is stolen and a plaintiff brings 
suit against a defendant for failure to give notice of the breach under SB 1386, the defendant 
who experienced the breach will need to prove that the data was encrypted at the time it was 
acquired from the system.  Unfortunately, even a security professional or forensic investigator 
might not be able to tell whether the data stolen was encrypted at the time it was taken from 
the system.174  At best, the defendant will be able to say that it had an encryption policy in place, 
employed the necessary technology to encrypt the data, and did everything else it could to ensure 
that data was encrypted whenever possible.
{48} Furthermore, the use of encryption may reduce liability, but only if it is properly installed, 
configured and managed.175  A defendant’s success in using the encryption defense will depend 
heavily on proof that it took measures to ensure the integrity of its encryption key.  Often, 
encryption key management systems are deployed but are not efficient and secure.176  The 
potential exposure under SB 1386 requires that organizations not only encrypt their data, but 
also limit access to the program that encrypts and decrypts information.177  In other words, even 
if the company encrypted all information on its systems as it rests in its database as well as 
in transit, the encrypted information may still be compromised depending on how the breach 
occurs.178  For example, if an employee of the organization is able to secure the encryption key 
and access and copy the data in unencrypted format, even though she is not authorized to do 
so as part of her duties, the damage may be done in spite of an otherwise vigorous encryption 
policy.179  Therefore, even organizations undertaking the burdensome task of encrypting all 
of the information on their systems, at rest and in transit, may lose the so-called encryption 
“exemption” unless they manage their encryption keys properly.180  It should also be noted that 
even if the information is stolen in encrypted format, once that information is decrypted, or if the 
organization acquires a reasonable belief that the data was not actually encrypted at the time of 
the theft, SB 1386’s disclosure provisions will likely be triggered.181  
{49} Organizations using encryption must also be realistic when it is being applied to static 
information such as social security numbers, driver’s license numbers and other data that does 
not change over time.   A thief could easily download this information after breaching the system 
and then keep the encrypted information until technology exists to crack the encryption.182  If the 
organization reasonably believes that the encryption has been cracked, notice will be required 
even if that reasonable belief is acquired many years after the initial breach and acquisition 
of the information.   It is also important to note that when encryption is employed, it must 
be applied with respect to every copy of the data and on every system on which the data is 
housed.183  This includes individual employees’ desktops and laptops.184  From the foregoing, 
it is clear that meeting the standards that will probably be required to successfully employ the 
encryption exemption is not as easy as it initially appears.
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2.  Temporary Law Enforcement Exemption
{50} As discussed above, notice of the breach need not be given immediately if the delay is 
“consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement.”  If an organization reports the 
breach to the police, it need not provide immediate notification to data subjects provided this 
delay is necessary to the investigation.185  Notification can also be delayed while the company 
determines the scope of the breach and restores the integrity of the system.186  Once integrity is 
restored, however, notice must be given if it will not “compromise” the investigation.  
{51} This exemption may have a positive effect if it results in an increase in the number of 
incidents reported to police, something law enforcement has long-awaited.187  The drawback 
of the exemption is that it temporarily thwarts the purpose of the bill—alerting consumers 
immediately so that they can be proactive in protecting themselves from identity theft.188  It is 
unclear whether a law enforcement agency, as opposed to the organization itself, must decide 
when delayed notice is appropriate to meet “the legitimate needs of law enforcement.”  This 
issue arises because SB 1386 does not state by whom the decision must be made.  Courts will 
most likely require that this decision be made by some law enforcement agency somewhere 
in the country.  Law enforcement agencies in California will be under pressure to disclose the 
existence of the breach as soon as possible.189  Because the bill has an impact on databases 
outside of California, however, the success of enforcement will heavily depend on the will of law 
enforcement authorities in other jurisdictions to vigorously apply the law enforcement provision.  
This aspect of the bill introduces politics to the enforcement process and gives rise to the 
possibility that law enforcement agencies outside of California may be encouraged by political 
pressure to protect local companies by conducting detailed and methodical (yet legitimate) 
investigations, thus expanding the time before notice must be given.190  This could be deemed a 
significant advantage for organizations operating outside of California.  
{52} The temptation may be to go to law enforcement immediately in order to help the 
organization “buy time” to plan and strategize.191  Organizations have to be careful, however, 
not to overemphasize the law enforcement “safe harbor” as a means of unreasonably delaying 
notice.  Although the investigation could take a great deal of time, nothing in the law allows this 
to be used as a means of indefinitely putting off notice to consumers.  Moreover, nothing in the 
law requires consumers to wait until the completion of a law enforcement investigation before 
filing suit for negligence or breach of contract associated with the incident.   If information 
pertaining to the breach is leaked to data subjects who have experienced actual losses as 
a result of a breach, they are free to file suit against the organization under common law or 
statutory theories of negligence and breach of contract without waiting for the completion of the 
criminal investigation.
{53} In the end, the decision to notify law enforcement must be made in consultation with 
counsel.192  The company must weigh the loss of control over the investigation against the 
benefit of the delay provided by this temporary safe harbor.  Getting law enforcement involved 
early may lead to quick apprehension of the culprit.  It may also lessen the impact on the 
company’s reputation if police announce the security breach to the public and simultaneously 
announce that the hacker has been arrested.193  The possibility of being in a position of 
delivering positive news of the arrest with the negative news of the breach might tip the scales 
in favor of seeking help from law enforcement at the outset.   
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{54} Overall, the law enforcement provision is a necessary evil in balancing the interests of 
organizations and individuals.  As noted above, however, organizations must be careful not to rely 
on this provision for long periods of time.  Organizations must avoid over-reliance on this provision 
in order to avert the embarrassing possibility of the breach disclosure coming from another 
source.  If data subjects are less angry when they hear of the breach, they are less likely to pursue 
litigation.
G.  SB 1386 Authorizes Private Right of Action
1.  Narrow Cause of Action
{55} Much ado has been made about the possibility that SB 1386 will lead to class action 
lawsuits and large judgments in civil suits.194  The bill itself, however, only addresses a very 
narrow security breach liability issue.  This law does not create a new cause of action against an 
organization for permitting a computer security breach to occur.  It merely requires that breached 
organizations give notice once they have a reasonable belief that a data subject’s personal 
information has been acquired.  It is the failure to give notice, rather than the failure to prevent a 
breach from occurring, that triggers the right to file a civil suit for damages under SB 1386. 
{56} SB 1386 limits damages to those arising from an organization’s failure to give notice of the 
breach.  Therefore, a plaintiff seeking damages under this bill would have to show that:  (1) the 
defendant’s system was breached; (2) the plaintiff is a California resident; (3) the defendant had 
a reasonable belief that the plaintiff’s personal information (as defined in SB 1386) was acquired 
during the breach; (4) the defendant failed to give plaintiff notice as required by the bill; and (5) 
the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of defendant’s failure to give her notice.  The plaintiff 
will have the burden of proving that she is a California resident and suffered damages, but will 
also have to prove that it is more likely than not that she suffered damages as a result of the 
defendant’s failure to give her notice.195  
{57} Plaintiffs seeking to hold an organization accountable for damages that arise from the 
security breach itself will need to look outside SB 1386.  The duty to exercise due care in 
protecting information from breach will be found in existing state and federal statutes196 and 
the common law.  These sources of law will provide the vehicles that will drive litigation in this 
area.  For example, even before the enactment of SB 1386, when a system breach occurred, the 
data subject already had the option of filing suit for negligence or breach of contract197 under 
appropriate circumstances.  Therefore, public anger arising as a result of an organization’s 
failure to give notice under SB 1386 will more likely serve as a catalyst that leads to the filing 
of a negligence or contract cause of action than as the sole cause of action in a case arising as 
a result of a computer security breach.  In other words, any attorney pleading a case under SB 
1386 for failure to give notice will necessarily include a negligence or contract claim to address 
any negligence that may have caused the breach itself.
2.  Only “Customers” May Sue?
{58} SB 1386 limits the right to sue to “customers”, yet another term undefined by the bill.  The 
bill refers to data subjects generically throughout the bill, but then mysteriously limits the right 
to sue to “customers.”  This is unusual because the bill’s notice requirement is not only imposed 
on companies (which have customers), but on California government agencies and individuals 
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as well.  The use of the word “customer” would also appear to limit a company’s employees 
from suing it for failing to give notice of a breach unless the employee is also a customer of the 
business.198  The use of the term “customer” would also seem to remove suits against the State 
of California from its remedies unless the data subject could somehow prove that he or she was 
a “customer” of the state.  This is ironic because it was a breach of employee information in a 
California state database that caused the bill to be passed in the first place.199  Therefore, in the 
end, SB 1386 does not even address the specific circumstances that lead to its passage.  This 
provision needs to be amended by the California legislature to allow suit by employees and all 
persons affected by an organization’s failure to give timely notice.
H.  SB 1386 Does Not Expressly Require Organizations to Establish a Security Program
{59} SB 1386 stops short of expressly requiring the implementation of a security program.  
There is, however, no question that SB 1386 implicitly sends the message that organizations 
and persons must “prevent, detect and monitor intrusions.”200  For example, it encourages 
organizations to employ encryption (which is only part of a security program).  It also rewards 
companies that monitor their systems closely enough to recognize when activities reach 
the point where it is reasonable to conclude that personal information has been acquired.  
Companies that do not closely monitor activities on their systems may find themselves sending 
notices every time their intrusion detection system reveals an anomaly.  Despite these efforts 
to reward a sound security program, nothing in SB 1386 expressly requires an organization to 
implement a security program. 201  The only duty expressly required in the bill is to give notice 
of a breach once reasonable belief of data acquisition occurs.  The duty to safeguard personal 
information will be found outside SB 1386, in federal statutes,202 contract law or negligence law. 
IV.  IS THERE A SOLUTION AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL?
A.  SB 1386 Is At Odds With the Bush Administration Approach
{60} SB 1386 takes an approach that is at odds with the Bush Administration’s cyber security 
policy.  The Administration favors self-regulation and secret disclosures203 to select government 
agencies, rather than public warnings.204  The Administration has opposed breach notification 
and federally mandated security standards in favor of accommodating business concerns 
and encouraging voluntary submission205 of information regarding breaches.206   The Bush 
Administration avoided this type of disclosure law in developing its cybersecurity policy, as 
stated in The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.207  The rapid growth of fraud and identity 
theft may give the Bush Administration little choice but to promote consumer notice over 
corporate self-regulation.
B.  Federal Legislation
{61} The Bush Administration’s pro-business approach has not stopped the introduction of two 
bills pending before the U.S. Congress.  Although businesses do not generally support breach 
notification legislation, they do agree that if there is going to be legislation in this area, it should 
be addressed at the federal level rather than through piecemeal state legislation.208  The fear 
is that if the individual states all create conflicting legislation requiring breach notification, 
organizations that do business nationwide will be buried in an avalanche of what could be 
conflicting obligations.  The U.S. Senate currently has a bill pending that might avoid this feared 
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piecemeal approach.  There is also a bill pending in the House of Representatives that would 
require breach notification in the banking industry.
  
1.  Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act
{62} On June 26, 2003, just five days before the effective date of SB 1386, Dianne Feinstein, 
a U.S. Senator from California, introduced S. 1350, the Notification of Risk to Personal Data 
Act (NORPDA).209   Many of the provisions in NORPDA are borrowed directly from SB 1386.  
Unfortunately, many of the borrowed provisions suffer from the same vagueness that plagues SB 
1386.  There are, however some subtle differences between NORPDA and SB 1386.  The notable 
provisions in NORPDA are:
• NORPDA defines breach of system security as “the compromise of the security, 
confidentiality, or integrity of computerized data that results in, or there is a reasonable 
basis to conclude has resulted in, the unauthorized acquisition of and access to personal 
information . . .”  (emphasis added).210 
• Under NORPDA, once a “breach of the security system” is discovered, notice must be sent 
to United States residents whose “unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably 
believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.”211  This notice provision 
is obviously much broader than SB 1386 because it clearly would have international 
implications and affect every database owner in the world maintaining personal 
information (as defined in NORPDA) on U.S. residents.212
• NORPDA applies to agencies and persons engaged in interstate commerce.  “Agency” 
includes most governmental bodies, the most notable exceptions being the Congress and 
the federal courts.213
• Like SB 1386, NORPDA does not require an organization to give notice of a breach if it 
already “maintains its own reasonable notification provisions as part of an information 
security policy for the treatment of personal information” and it actually “notifies subject 
persons in accordance with its information security policy in the event of a breach of 
security of the system.”214 (emphasis added).  NORPDA, however, goes further than 
SB 1386 by defining acceptable notification procedures.  In order for its “notification 
provisions” to be deemed “reasonable”, an organization must:
o “use a security program reasonably designed to block unauthorized transactions 
before they are charged to the customer’s account”215 
o use a security program that requires notice to data subjects “after the security 
program indicates that the breach of the system has resulted in fraud or 
unauthorized transactions, but does not necessarily require notice under other 
circumstances” 216 
o be “subject to examination for compliance with this Act by 1 or more Federal 
functional regulators (as defined in section 509 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15 
U.S.C. section 6809)[217], with respect to the operation of the security program and 
the notification procedures.” 218
• Rather than authorizing a private right of action for damages, as allowed in SB 1386, 
NORPDA provides civil remedies ($5,000 per violation and up to $25,000 per day while 
the violation persists) that must be enforced by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 219  
NORPDA does not, however, expressly or implicitly exempt organizations from private suits 
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and class-actions in the event of a breach.220
• Like SB 1386, NORPDA would allow equitable relief to enjoin ongoing or proposed 
violations of its provisions.  Unlike SB 1386, however, these equitable actions would need 
to be filed by the FTC, not affected data subjects. 221  State Attorneys General would also 
be authorized by NORPDA222 to enjoin organizations, enforce compliance with the Act, and 
obtain damages, restitution or other compensation on behalf of U.S. residents.223
• NORPDA would not affect other remedies available under law.  For example, contract or 
negligence actions or actions filed under SB 1386 can still be pursued even if this bill 
becomes law. 224  State or local electronic breach notification laws that are inconsistent 
with NORPDA will be superseded, “except as provided under sections 1798.82 and 
1798.29 of the California Civil Code.”225   Therefore, SB 1386 is preserved, but legislation 
on the subject passed by another state would be barred by the Supremacy Clause.226  
 3.  The Identity Theft Consumer Notification Act
{63} In 2002, a former Bank One employee in Wisconsin gave a ring of identity thieves account 
information and social security numbers on 250 bank customers.227   Upon discovery of the 
theft, Bank One fired the employee but failed to notify its customers.228  Eight months later, 
a retiree who was a customer of the bank discovered that a new Jaguar had been purchased 
in his name. 229  Once this incident achieved notoriety in the local press, Bank One notified its 
customers of the data theft.230  
{64} In response to this incident, two members of the U.S. House of Representatives from 
Wisconsin, Jerry Kleczka and Paul Ryan, introduced a bill requiring banks to notify customers if 
personal data is stolen.231  The highlights of H.R. 818, the Identity Theft Consumer Notification 
Act,232 are as follows:
• Notification to consumers would be required “upon discovering that the confidentiality 
or security of any nonpublic personal information maintained by the financial institution 
with respect to a consumer has been compromised in any way by an employee of the 
financial institution, or through any unauthorized entry into the records of the financial 
institution.”233  H.R. 818 is, therefore, different from NORPDA and SB 1386 because H.R. 
818 is limited to personal information held by financial institutions.   
• The language in H.R. 818 does not limit the scope of a security breach to computerized 
information.  Unlike SB 1386 and NORPDA, it applies to paper records as well.234  As 
noted previously, neither NORPDA nor SB 1386 apply to paper records and, therefore, 
treat similarly situated identity theft victims differently.
• Unlike SB 1386 and NORPDA, H.R. 818 would require more than mere notice to the 
consumer.  It would also require that the financial institution assist the consumer in 
fixing the problems caused by the breach of security, including correcting and updating 
information in consumer credit reports as required by the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 235   
H.R. 818 would also expressly require reimbursement for consumer losses incurred as a 
result of the breach or misuse of the data, “including any fees for obtaining, investigating, 
and correcting a consumer report of such consumer at any consumer reporting 
agency.”236  Finally, the financial institution would be required to assist consumers in 
repairing damage to their credit arising from the breach.237  Section 618(a) of the bill 
would authorize private suit in an appropriate U.S. District Court (without regard for the 
amount in controversy) or in any other court of competent jurisdiction.238  
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• The statute of limitations provision requires that actions filed under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act must be filed no later than 2 years after the date on which the violation is 
discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.239
• Like SB 1386 and NORPDA, H.R. 818 contains a law enforcement safe harbor.  H.R. 818’s 
provision allows for a temporary “waiver” of the notice requirement “at the request of a 
law enforcement agency investigating such violation for such limited period of time as 
the law enforcement agency determines is essential for carrying out the investigation.”240  
This language is far better than that used for the temporary law enforcement exemptions 
under SB 1386 and NORPDA because it makes clear that law enforcement authorities 
must make the decision that notification would interfere with the investigation.
V.  HOW SHOULD BUSINESSES AND CONSUMERS PROTECT THEMSELVES?
A.  Businesses
{65} The best way for an organization to avoid the effect of notification statutes and the litigation 
they might spawn is to secure its systems.241  Companies should focus more on front-end security 
and avoid quick fixes.242  In order to avoid being a victim of security breaches and avoid problems 
with breach notification laws, businesses should consider the following measures:
• Review your organization’s policies243 regarding access to sensitive information in 
existing systems and the systems of clients or business partners.244
• Access to personal information should be limited to those authorized persons in your 
company who need to know it.245  
• Restrict the situations in which access to personal information may be downloaded 
and saved to laptops,246 desktop computers247 and other disk media issued to 
employees.  Employees must be forbidden from transferring personal data maintained 
by the organization to the employees’ personal computers.  
• Review your organization’s privacy policies posted on its website or in print ads.  Make 
sure that your company can deliver on the promises made in those policies.  For 
example, do not promise that all information is encrypted all of the time.  
• Review your organization’s password policies, making sure that passwords are not 
inadvertently accessible to other employees or outsiders.248
• Create or modify your organization’s procedures for detecting and reporting 
breaches.249
• Determine whether your organization already requires the notification of data subjects 
whose personal information has been breached in a manner consistent with SB 1386’s 
requirements.250  If the procedures do not measure up, modify them so they comply 
with the law.
• Determine what “personal information” regarding California residents is contained 
on your system and document the information contained on each system.251  Review 
your internal and external procedures to determine whether they provide reasonable 
protection against breach.252
• Install firewalls253 and authentication protocols to protect personal data.254
• Employ audit trails to track events occurring on the system so you can determine who 
(or what) caused them.255
• Employ intrusion detection software256 or other mechanisms by which you can 
determine the extent to which the system has been compromised and the extent to 
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which information has been accessed.257
• If your company does not have the skills or the forensic tools necessary to make the 
simple determination that there has been a breach, it should acquire those skills and 
capabilities immediately or retain the services of companies who specialize in this 
area.258
• Review and amend any third party storage agreements you have with external data 
centers,259 making sure that those agreements require the vendor to notify your 
company in the event of a breach.260  If you outsource your data storage, you need 
to have your legal counsel revisit those agreements, paying careful attention to 
the security provided at the data storage facility.261  Take the time to learn about 
the security procedures employed at the storage facility and audit its procedures 
periodically.
• Educate, train and re-train employees about SB 1386 and the general practices and 
legal requirements for securing data.262  Though it is an essential part of an effective 
security program under any circumstances, it could also help reduce the possibility of 
punitive damages if a negligence action is brought based on the security breach.263  
• Establish a contingency plan that focuses on preserving and documenting evidence, 
especially when the system contains your clients’ or your own trade secrets. 264
• Consider whether it is feasible to separate data subjects’ first names, initials and last 
names from social security numbers, driver’s license numbers and other account 
information on the system.  If this can be done without overburdening efficiency, two 
systems would have to be breached before notice is required.265
• Require that customers periodically update their addresses in your organization’s 
database as a condition of online transactions.266
• Check your insurance policy to see whether it covers cyber crimes.267  If it does not, 
perform due diligence to determine whether cyber insurance is feasible for your 
business. 
• Have the suggestions herein reviewed by a computer security professional and your 
legal counsel to ensure that additional or different steps are not required by your 
organization’s particular circumstances.
{66} If your system is breached:
• “[T]ake measures to determine the scope of the breach and restore reasonable 
integrity to the data system before notifying California residents.”268
• Check to see whether the time/date stamp has been modified on any of the personal 
information files.269
• Where feasible, hire a reputable security company to perform any needed forensic 
assessment of the breach.270  Using your own organization’s personnel may result 
in law enforcement refusing to take action because chain of custody issues will be 
clouded by the company’s self-interest potential.271
• Communications between the organization and law enforcement should be 
documented wherever possible.   Indeed, everything that happens after the breach 
must be documented with the degree of care that would be exercised in preparing for 
a lawsuit.272
B. Consumers
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Fall 2003- Volume X, Issue 1
TIMOTHY H. SKINNER- CALIFORNIA’S DATABASE BREACH NOTIFICATION SECURITY ACT
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Fall 2003- Volume X, Issue 1
TIMOTHY H. SKINNER- CALIFORNIA’S DATABASE BREACH NOTIFICATION SECURITY ACT
{67} When identity theft occurs, it is generally the consumer who is “left to clean up the mess.”273  
If you receive an SB 1386 notice from a business or California state agency, you should: 
 • Closely monitor all credit card and financial statements in search of unusual
  activity.  Because of the ease with which information spreads, once your identity is 
  stolen, you must monitor your accounts for years.274  
 • Change your credit card and bank debit accounts immediately.
 • Notify your bank and credit card companies by phone and in writing and advise
  them that you are to be contacted before any new accounts are opened in your 
  name.
 • Contact the company that sent you the notice in writing and request as much
  information as possible regarding the nature of the breach (to the extent not
  covered in the notice), whether the company can confirm whether your personal
  information was, in fact, stolen from its system, the status of the investigation,
  whether any of the information stolen has been used for illicit purposes and the
  company’s plans for fixing the problem.
 • If it is your employer who suffered the breach:  ask the same questions stated
  above and contact your union representative, if applicable.
VI.  CONCLUSION
{68} Computer security breaches are occurring at an alarming rate, thus causing identity 
thefts to soar.  Identity thieves are taking advantage of system vulnerabilities caused by some 
organizations’ failure to employ effective security measures to protect personal information.  
The old paradigm, focusing mainly on criminal prosecution of hackers, has been tried and 
has largely failed.  Organizations must be held accountable and required to be responsible for 
protecting personal information they store in computer databases as well as in file cabinets.  The 
government has waited long enough for market forces to cause organizations to take computer 
security seriously.
{69} By enacting SB 1386, California has established a good starting point for addressing 
legislation in this area.  The law, however, suffers from too much ambiguity to serve as the final 
template for national breach notification legislation.  Although the law appears to strike a good 
balance between the needs of data subjects and organizations experiencing computer security 
breaches, the law fails to provide definitions for key terms that carry multiple meanings.  For 
example, the law does not define the term “unencrypted” or the phrase “was, or is reasonably 
believed to have been, acquired.”  These omissions make it difficult for companies to comply 
with the law’s ambiguous provisions and will most certainly complicate enforcement.  The U.S. 
Congress should make sure that the type of encryption demanded under NORPDA or any federal 
breach notification legislation is specified clearly in the law.  
{70} Furthermore, SB 1386 also fails to address security breaches involving paper records.  This 
omission is surprising because theft of paper data also gives rise to identity theft.  California and 
Senator Feinstein should follow the lead of the authors of H.R. 818 and expand the scope of SB 
1386 and NORPDA to provide notice to victims of paper record breaches as well.
{71} Moreover, SB 1386 needs to be amended to define or replace the word “customer” in 
the provision allowing a private right of action.  It simply does not make sense to draft a law 
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because of an event involving a breach of state computers that resulted in the disclosure of 
California employees’ personal information, yet provide no cause of action for California state 
employees against the state.  Restricting the right to sue to “customers” also limits the right 
of employees to sue their private sector employers (unless the employee also happens to be a 
customer) if the employers fail to give them notice of a breach.  There is no justifiable reason for 
treating employees differently than customers.  Both parties provide private information to the 
organization with the reasonable expectation that it will be kept safe.  Unless there is a method 
by which organizations can be held accountable to their employees, employees will remain 
viable targets for identity thieves.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
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CalifDataHacking.htm (June 11, 2002).
75 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29.  SB 1386’s definition of “personal information” is fairly narrow.  Hurley, supra note 68.  
Not all types of information deemed personal in other contexts are covered by SB 1386.  The general definition of 
personal identifying information is much broader than the types of information covered by this Act.  For example, 
the California penal code defines “personal identifying information” broadly to include: name, address, telephone 
number, driver’s license number, social security number, place of employment, employee identification number, 
mother’s maiden name, demand deposit account number, savings account number, or credit card number of an 
individual person.”  CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.5 (2003).  The federal Privacy Act defines “records” protected by the Act to 
include: 
any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an 
agency, including, but not limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical history, 
and criminal or employment history and that contains his name, or the identifying number, 
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice 
print or a photograph.  
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2003).  Most of these types of personal information are not covered by SB 1386. 
76 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29(f), 1798.82(a).
77 Id. §§ 1798.29, 1798.82.  SB 1386 does not, however, mandate that notice occur within a set time period.  Hurley, 
supra note 68.
78 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84.  During hearings prior to the passage of SB 1386, the Information Technology Association 
of America (ITAA) noted its concern that there was no cap on liability included in the bill.  Assembly Comm. on 
Appropriations, SB 1386 Summary, at 2-3, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_1351-
1400/sb_1386_cfa_20020813_145811_asm_comm.html (Aug. 14, 2002).  
79 Id. § 1798.82.
80 Id.
81 Substitute notice may be done by e-mail, conspicuous posting on the website of the party whose system was 
breached, via notice to statewide media (presumably in California, though not stated), or via the party’s own 
notification procedures as long as they comply with other provisions of SB 1386.  Id. § 1789.29(h).  
82 It is unclear what a company would be required to say in web site or media notices.  Piper Rudnick Alert, supra 
note 29, at 5. 
83 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82.
84 Act effective July 1, 2003, ch. 915, § 5, 2003 Cal. Stat. 90.  One author has noted that the delayed effective date 
of SB 1386 was at the request of Merrill Lynch so it could revamp its security to encrypt its financial data so it could 
take advantage of this provision in the bill.  LaFlamme, supra note 6.  
85  SB 1386 was introduced Feb. 12, 2002.  S.B. 1386, 2002 Leg. (Cal. 2002), available at http://
www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1386_bill_20020212_introduced.pdf (Feb. 12, 2003) 
[hereinafter S.B. 1386, Feb. bill].  The notification provision was not contained in the original version of the bill when 
it was introduced by Senator Pace.  S.B. 1386, reprinted as amended, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/
01-02/bill/sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1386_bill_20020320_amended_sen.pdf (Mar. 20, 2002) [hereinafter S.B. 1386, 
Mar. amendment].  The bill was amended in the California Senate to include this provision.  This early version of 
the law allowed organizations to report the breach “as soon as practicable.”  S.B. 1386, reprinted as amended (Cal. 
2002), at 2, § 2(a) [hereinafter S.B. 1386, June amendment], available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/
sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1386_bill_20020620_amended_asm.pdf (June 20, 2002); June 18 Judiciary Committee 
Analysis, supra note 45, at 5.  This language was deleted when the bill was amended in the California Assembly, 
because it was feared that this provision would be used by agencies or businesses to wait, “for example, an entire 
year to notify affected employees and individuals.”  Id.  In addition, the Committee added the potential impedance 
of an ongoing law enforcement investigation as a proper justification for delaying notice.  A prior draft of the bill also 
required notice “to any person whose personal information was, or may have been, accessed by an unauthorized 
person.”  On June 20, 2002, this language was amended to require notice to persons “whose personal information 
was, or is reasonably believed to have been, accessed by an unauthorized person.”  S.B. 1386, June amendment.
86  Thibodeau, supra note 6; see also SIFT Security Intelligence, SIFT Note 2003-01 (Jan. 15, 2003), available at http:
//www.iia.net.au/SIFT_Note_2003_01.pdf (Sept. 1, 2003).  It has also been noted that when companies publicly 
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share information regarding attacks, patches are applied, thus reducing the chance for further exploitation of 
targets.
87  Coleman, supra note 46.
88  Coleman, supra note 46.  The Director of TransUnion’s victim fraud unit believes that “[t]ime is against them if 
they wait too long.”  Id.  As discussed in more detail in the encryption discussion, this may not always be the case 
when static encrypted information, such as social security numbers and birth dates, are involved and the thieves 
can hold on to the encrypted information until decryption techniques become available.  Id.  Most criminals, 
however, are not interested in waiting a few years to exploit the fruits of their labor.  Id.
89  Ryan Singel, Bill to Force Data Theft Notices, Wired News (June 27, 2003), at http://www.wired.com/news/
privacy/0,1848,59419,00.html (Aug. 28, 2003).
90 June 18 Judiciary Committee Analysis, supra note 45.  The Investment Company Institute (ICI), a coalition that 
represents the mutual fund industry, opposed the notice provision, stating, “persons will be unable to take any 
meaningful prophylactic action to protect themselves in response to the notice.”  Id.
91  Ellen Messmer, Calif. Breach-Disclosure Law Raises Questions, Concerns, NetworkWorld Fusion, at http://
www.nwfusion.com/news/2003/0630california.html (June 30, 2003).
92  Anonymous Posting, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished, Matthew Lewis Carroll Smith Web Blog, at http:
//www.mlcsmith.com/blog/ (Jan. 15, 2003) (relating a consumer’s experience with identity theft; the bank’s 
response to the consumer’s inquiry was, “you’re covered so it’s no big deal.”).
93  Visa, Zero Liability [hereinafter Visa Zero Liability Policy], at http://www.usa.visa.com/personal/secure_with_
visa/zero_liability. html?it=h2/index.html (Aug. 28, 2003).  For example, Visa’s “Zero Liability” policy states that 
it provides 100% protection for the customer.  It then reminds customers to monitor their monthly statements for 
unauthorized transactions.  By way of the following notation, Visa cautions its customers that zero liability does not 
always mean what it says:
Cardholders should always regularly check their monthly statements for transaction 
accuracy.  Financial institutions may impose greater liability on the cardholder if the 
financial institution reasonably determines that the unauthorized transaction was caused 
by the gross negligence or fraudulent action of the cardholder – which may include your 
delay for an unreasonable time in reporting unauthorized transactions.
Id.  Visa notes that this is an improvement over its former policy, which required cardholders to report unauthorized 
transactions within two days of discovery.  Discover Financial Services, 100% Fraud Protection, at http://
www2.discovercard.com/simple_secure/fraudprotection.shtml (last visited Sept. 1, 2003).  Discover also requires 
cardholders to “immediately” notify the company if they think that their cards were used without their permission, 
but Discover’s policy does not expressly state what it will do in the event that cardholders fail to act in accordance 
with this instruction.  Id.  The credit card industry’s argument ignores the fact that the costs associated with the 
fraudulent transactions, which are “absorbed” by the credit card companies under zero liability policies, are then 
promptly passed on to consumers, either directly through higher consumer credit card fees or indirectly through 
increased credit card retailer fees, which are, in turn, passed on to consumers via price increases on goods and 
services.  
94  June 18 Judiciary Committee Analysis, supra note 45.
95  LaFlamme, supra note 6.
96  Jerald M. Savin, Businesses Must Disclose Security Breaches, CALCPA ONLINE, at http://www.calcpa.org/
members/knowledge/articles/webprivacy.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2003).
97  Kevin Poulsen, California Disclosure Law Has National Reach, SECURITYFOCUS, at http://www.securityfocus.com/
news/1984 (Jan. 6, 2003).
98  Benjamin Wright, Data Privacy in California, News in Electronic Commerce Law, at http://
ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/Ben_Wright/e-biz.htm (Feb. 2003).  Many businesses have expressed 
little concern over the notice provision because they have existing policies which require notice.  Konrad, supra 
note 27 (citing a spokeswoman for Dell Computer who stated that Dell has had such procedures in place for a long 
time); see also Messmer, supra note 91 (quoting an eBay spokesman who claimed that eBay has been breached 
numerous times and already has a notification policy); Hulme, supra note 35.  Security experts believe, however, 
that most businesses outside of the heavily regulated banking and health care sectors are not prepared for dealing 
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with this law.  Hulme, supra note 35.
99  Wright, supra note 98.
100 See B. Mahadevan and N.S. Venkatesh, A Framework for Building On-Line Trust for Business to Business E-
Commerce, at http://unix2.iimb.ernet.in/~mahadev/trust1.pdf (Nov. 30, 2000) (discussing the business implications 
for interception of online data transmission, as presented at the November 2000 IT Asia Millennium Conference in 
Bombay, India); cf. Press Release, Sigaba Corp. Details Top Ten Requirements of a Secure E-Mail Solution, Sigaba 
Corp., at http://www.sigaba.com/news/pressreleases/2-27-02tenreq.html (Feb. 27, 2002).
101  Litan & Pescatore, supra note 35.
102  StrongAuth, supra note 70.
103  StrongAuth, supra note 70.  The breadth of this provision arguably calls into question the issue of whether 
California’s attempt to regulate companies outside the state is an effort to affect interstate commerce, a power 
reserved to Congress under the Constitution.
104  Poulsen, supra note 97.
105  Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 4. 
106  Hackett & Caldwell, supra note 73, at 7.
107  Erik Laykin, New California Law to Impact Global Business – SB 1386, Online Security, at http://
www.onlinesecurity.com/Community_Forum_detail.php?article_id=102 (Apr. 22, 2003).
108  Messmer, supra note 91 (noting the problems that will occur when databases are not updated to keep track of 
consumers who establish new residences).
109  Letter from Ken Wasch, President, Software & Info. Indus. Ass’n, to The Honorable Gray Davis, Governor, 
California (Sept. 16, 2002) (on file with Richmond Journal of Law & Technology).  Obtaining and storing physical 
addresses at the time of the transaction would not necessarily be helpful, because up to 17% of U.S. residents 
change their physical address each year.  Id.
110  Id. at 3.  SB 1386 does not contain a provision allowing for delayed notification while the companies determine 
the current addresses of their data subjects.  Hackett & Caldwell, supra note 73, at 8.  The author of the bill was 
asked to remedy this issue by allowing companies to rely on the addresses contained in their records at the time of 
the breach, however, this request was declined.  Hackett & Caldwell, supra note 73, at 8.
111 Although some critics have argued that this law could cause organizations to avoid collecting and retaining 
information regarding California residents, the task of trying to keep California residents out of your database could 
prove to be more expensive than complying with the law.  If It Weren’t For the Weather, supra note 38.  Such a policy 
would also be fiscally unsound for businesses seeking to attract customers nationwide.  It would also invite legal 
liability because an organization can never be totally sure that a person in its database has not become a resident of 
California since the time it first obtained that person’s information.  
112 April 2003 Update, Montebello Partners, Internet Security Update, at http://www.montebellopartners.com/
Security/Default.asp (April 2003). 
113 Id. at 5.  
114 Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 6.
115 Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 6.
116 If It Weren’t For the Weather, supra note 38.
117 Deborah Birnbach and Kimberly Nuzum, New Law Requires Disclosure of Security Breaches, Testa, Hurwitz & 
Thibeault Client Bulletin, at http://www.tht.com/pubs/SearchMatchPub.asp?ArticleID=939 (May 14, 2003). 
118 See Thibodeau, supra note 6  (explaining that companies have to report “not only actual compromises, but 
suspected compromises as well.”).  
119 The Investment Company Institute (ICI) also complained during California Senate hearings because the bill 
requires notice whether or not there is “a suspected or expected case of identity theft resulting from the breach.”  
Personal Information, Privacy: Hearing on S.B. 1386 Before the Assembly Committee on Business and Professions, 
2002 Leg. (Cal. 2002), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1386_cfa_2--
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20804_191651_asm_comm.html (Aug. 6, 2002). 
120 Id.  
121 Some organizations are already decrying the breadth of SB 1386 as they prepare for difficult implementation. 
Meeting Minutes from the University of California at Davis Technology Infrastructure Forum at III, at http:
//tif.ucdavis.edu/meetings/02_26_03/ (Feb. 26, 2003).  For example, during the meeting cited herein, some 
members noted “that the task of identifying all staff and faculty who store personal information on their computers 
is close to impossible.” Id..
122 Personal Information, supra note 119 (estimating that the cost of compliance for the mutual fund industry will 
be in the “tens of millions of dollars.”).
123 Laykin, supra note 107, at para. 9; see also Hackett & Caldwell, supra note 73, at 7.  Critics complain that the 
law creates a gray area that does not make clear what constitutes a “security breach.”  Vamosi, supra note 12, at 
para. 6.
124 Laykin, supra note 107, at para. 9.
125 Vamosi, supra note 12.
126 Konrad, supra note 27.
127 Konrad, supra note 27, at paras. 11, 20.  
128 Armour, supra note 22.  
129 StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 108.   
130 An IDS is defined as follows:
An intrusion detection system is now an essential part of network security defen[s]es. 
Firewalls will stop most unwanted traffic. But firewalls need to allow some traffic or there 
could be no connection with the Internet.  Such ‘legal’ traffic can allow intruders into your 
LAN. . . . An intrusion detection system can detect dubious activity on the network. This can 
be by recogni[z]ing attack patterns, or by comparing network usage with security policy.  
For example, the policy may state that a particular workstation can only be used during 
standard office hours. If it logs on at 3:00 am, it would be reasonable to assume that 
something untoward is happening.
ITSecurity.com, Firewall, COMPUTER SECURITY DICTIONARY, supra note 53.
131 Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 5.
132 Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 5; see also Marcia Savage, California Security Law Could Bring 
Opportunity, CRN.com, at http://www.crn.com/sections/News/top_news.asp?ArticleID=42043 (May 16, 2003) 
(suggesting that small or less security-savvy companies could claim that they did not report a breach because they 
did not know about it).  
133 Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 6.  Organizations should be careful not assume that ignorance is bliss 
under SB 1386.  Failing to monitor an organization’s system in order to avoid discovering breaches that might 
trigger the notice provision would be ill-advised.  StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 109.  Ignoring or outright 
avoiding information that might indicate that an organization’s system is insecure could result in a finding that the 
organization has violated the standard of care in the industry and was, therefore, negligent.  Id.  Even if such a “see 
no evil hear no evil” policy could avoid liability under SB 1386, the damage to an organization’s reputation when 
this fact is eventually exposed could be far more costly than the cost of compliance.  Id.  
134 Poulsen, supra note 97, at para. 3.  The statute also fails to define the word “compromised.”  One commentator 
aptly noted that “[o]nly God, or the California Supreme Court, whichever has higher jurisdiction, knows what the 
word ‘compromises’ means.”  Posting of Tom Frerichs to TalkBack (April 28, 2003), at http://forums.zdnet.com/
group/zd.Anchordesk/anchordesk/anchordesktb.tpt/@thread@93153@forward@1@D-,D@ALL/@article@93153?EX
P=ALL&VWM=hr&ROS=1& (commenting on Vamosi, supra note 12).  It is, therefore, impossible to know for certain 
when an intrusion has resulted in a compromise.  Armour, supra note 22, at para. 12.
135 Poulsen, supra note 97, at para. 10.
136 There is also a serious question as to whether a single incident or even a handful of incidents involving data 
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subjects with information stored on a breached system would motivate an organization to find that the acquisition 
of data resulted from the breach of the Defendant’s system, as opposed to acquisition from some other source (i.e. 
credit card receipts stolen from the garbage, interception of data in other internet transactions, etc.).   
137 One company advertises that with its software, “organizations can forensically examine an incident in order to 
determine with 100 percent accuracy what information was accessed, created or deleted.”  Press Release, Guidance 
Software’s Encase Enterprises Provides Incident Response Capabilities Needs to Support Compliance of California 
Law SB 1386, Guidance Software, at http://www.guidancesoftware.com/corporate/press/2003/20030414.shm 
(Apr. 14, 2003).
138 Thibodeau, supra note 6 (noting that while an organization may know when someone has hacked into the system, 
the organization can’t “know if [the hacker has] acquired information or if they have just looked at information 
. . . [p]otentially, you will have to send out notices to a lot of people just because you don’t know” whether the 
information itself has been acquired.) 
139 StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 108.
140 StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 108.
141 Of course, if that organization’s data subjects suffer a rash of identity thefts, a company could be deemed to have 
a reasonable belief that data acquisition has occurred.
142 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(d).
143 Armour, supra note 22, at 3.
144 Susan J. Wells, Stolen Identity: When Employees Suffer From Identity Theft, Employers Also Pay the Price, HR 






150 “The most common definition of physical security is that it is the application of physical barriers and control 
procedures to protect information and information systems.”  ITSecurity.com, COMPUTER SECURITY DICTIONARY, Security, 
supra note 53.
151 Security: Identity Theft, HIPAA Implementation Newsletter, LPF.com, at http://www.lpf.com/hipaa/issue53.html 
(March 14, 2003).  
152 Laykin, supra note 107, at 2.
153 California Law Protecting Computerized Personal Information Takes Effect in July, Segal Compliance Alert, at  
http://www.segalco.com/publications/compliancealert/31903.html (March 19, 2003).  Before passage, many 
opponents also noted their fear that  SB 1386 would launch the creation of a complex and confusing patchwork 
of state legislation on this subject that would give rise to preemption issues where those state laws conflict with 
federal legislation on related topics.  August 14 Appropriations Committee Analysis, supra note 78 (recounting  that 
the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) noted its concern about piece-meal creation of different 
legislation at the state level). There have also been unsubstantiated allegations that SB 1386 may violate “current 
international conventions, directives, regulations or obligations.”  Saundra Kae Rubel, News You Can Use – Got 
California Customers?  There’s a New Law For You, Privacy Knowledge Base, at http://www.privacyknowledgebase.co
m/newsUse017_s.jsp (July 9, 2003).  
154 If It Weren’t For the Weather, supra note 38.
155 Will CA Law Spur Storage Crypto?, Light Reading.com, at http://www.byteandswitch.com/document.asp?doc_id=
31689&site=byteandswitch (April 22, 2003).   
156 StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 201(l).
157 Vamosi, supra note 12 (noting that “if customer data is encrypted, a company is exempt,” but explaining that the 
strength of the encryption is not dictated by the law); see also Will CA Law Spur Storage Crypto?, supra note 154; 
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Hurley, supra note 68 (quoting Scott Pink, deputy chairman of the American Bar Association’s Cybersecurity Task 
Force, who asks, “What if a company uses encryption that can be unscrambled by anyone?”.  Although the law does 
not specify the type of encryption to be used, the “spirit” of the law requires that the data be protected.  StrongAuth, 
supra note 70, at § 201(l).
158 Poulsen, supra note 97.
159 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), NIST Special Publication 800-18, Computer Security 
Research Center, at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/ 800-18/Planguide.PDF (Dec. 1998).  Saying that 
the notice requirement does not apply to “encrypted” information simply begs the question.  NIST requires federal 
government system owners to answer the following questions once they state in their System Security Plan that 
they employ decryption: “What cryptographic methodology (e.g., secret key and public key) is used? If a specific off-
the-shelf product is used, provide the name of the product. . . . If the product and the implementation method meet 
federal standards (e.g., Data Encryption Standard, Digital Signature Standard), include that information.”  Id. at 62.  
Does the system follow Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140 Level 1, which is used by the federal 
government for protecting classified information?  Id.  SB 1386 does not address any of these issues.  
160 Most companies and government organizations (with the exception of the Department of Defense and other 
agencies storing classified information) use authentication schemes that were developed in the 1960s, even 
though stronger authentication has existed for the past twenty years.  StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 304.  Ninety-
nine percent of the passwords used in these single-authentication schemes can be cracked in less than a half hour.  
Id.  The Department of Defense, however, employs Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140 Level 1.  
FIPS 140 Level 1 is “the most widely recognized encryption benchmark for cryptographic security best practices.”  
See Protegrity Secure, Data(t) Database Security Software to Offer Rsa Bsafe Encryption Software, ITSecurity.com, 
at http://www.itsecurity.com/tecsnews/mar2003/mar144.htm (Mar. 13, 2003).  This standard is “the most 
stringent government, industry and internal auditing standard for protecting the privacy of sensitive database 
information against external threats.”  Id.
161 The price for many encryption modules starts at $25,000 and goes up depending on the number of databases 
and CPU’s requiring configuration.  Protegrity Secure,Data(t) Database Security Software to offer Rsa Bsafe 
Encryption Software, supra note 160.
162 Cf. Will CA Law Spur Storage Crypto?, supra note 155 (discussing firewalls).
163 Cf. Will CA Law Spur Storage Crypto?, supra note 155.
164 StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 201(l).
165 See Will CA Law Spur Storage Crypto?, supra note 155. 
166 SSL is “[a] protocol originally developed by Netscape. It is a web encryption technology, mostly used by e-
commerce web pages throughout the world, to allow safe transactions without the risk of data eavesdropping 
by third parties. It was developed to enable the secure transmission of documents over the Internet. SSL 
creates a ‘secure’ connection between the client and host, enabling confidentiality of information transmitted.”  
ITsecurity.com, SSL, COMPUTER SECURITY DICTIONARY, supra note 53.  SSL is:
[A] public key encryption scheme that uses both public and private keys to authenticate 
users and provide secure communication between the browser and a website. Part of this 
process involves the server (the website) sending the client (the browser) its certificate. The 
certificate is provided by a CA, and guarantees the server’s authenticity so that the user can 
be confident about what resource the browser is talking to. After this key exchange takes 
place, a shared secret key is used to encrypt the data between browser and website. The 
existence of an SSL communication is indicated by a padlock icon in the bottom right hand 
corner of the browser screen.  
Id.  Technically, SSL has been superseded by Transport Layer Security (TLS).  “TLS is an Internet security 
protocol based on and very similar to SSL version 3.  It provides end-to-end encryption.” Id.  Most people, 
however, still refer to this technology as SSL.
167 StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 201(h).
168 StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 201(h).
169 Cf. Will CA Law Spur Storage Crypto?, supra note 155.  See generally Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 6 
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(noting that encrypting files only while in transit will not be enough).  If the California Senate did not intend to require 
encryption while the information is at rest on the hard drive as well as in transit, encryption would not have assisted 
in securing the data lost in the Teale Data Center incident.  The Teale Data Center data was sitting on a server at 
the time the system was attacked.  It was not in transit.  See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 46.  Generally, one would 
assume that a legislature at least hoped fix the problem that gave rise to the legislation. 
170 Cf. Will CA Law Spur Storage Crypto?, supra note 155 (discussing firewalls). 
171 Cf. Will CA Law Spur Storage Crypto?, supra note 155.
172 Wright, supra note 98, at § 6.
173 See If It Weren’t For the Weather, supra note 38.  
174 See If It Weren’t For the Weather, supra note 38.
175 Hal R. Varian, Managing Online Security Risks, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2000, at C2, available at http://
www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/people/hal/NYTimes/2000-06-01.html (citing Ross Anderson, Why Cryptosystems 
Fail, at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/wcf.ps.gz (2000)).
176 Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 6 (recommending that organizations assure that encryption key 
management systems are efficient and secure). 
177 Savin, supra note 92.
178 If It Weren’t For the Weather, supra note 38.
179 If It Weren’t For the Weather, supra note 38.
180 The provision that exempts “encrypted data” from the definition of “personal information,” the theft of which 
triggers the notice requirement, was not added until the bill was amended in Assembly on July 25, 2002.   SB 
1386, July Amendment, supra note 85.  In the Assembly Committee summary and analysis discussing the July 25 
amendments, encryption was referred to as a “safe harbor.”  Personal Information, supra note 119.  An analysis of 
this committee meeting notes, however, that while these safe harbors generally exempt the exposure of encrypted 
personal information from the provisions of this bill, encrypted personal information that has been both accessed 
and decrypted by a hacker would trigger the bill’s disclosure requirements.  Id.
181 See Personal Information, supra note 119 (“encrypted personal information that has been both accessed and 
decrypted by a hacker would trigger the bill’s disclosure requirements”); see also Poulsen, supra note 97 (questioning 
whether a company would be liable if someone breaches the system and subsequently steals and decrypts poorly 
encrypted information).  In this situation, the organization may need to provide notice after a certain number of data 
subjects have reported facts suggesting identity theft because at this point, a court may find that the organization 
acquired a reasonable belief that “unencrypted” personal information has been acquired as a result of the breach 
(thus triggering the notice provision).  This may be the outcome even though the data was encrypted at the time it 
was stolen.
182 Poulsen, supra note 97.
183 StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 201(l).
184 StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 201(l).
185 Analysis of August 5, 2002 Amendments to SB 1386, Franchise Tax Board, available at http://www.ftb.ca.gov/
other/legis/01_02absb/SB1386_080502.pdf  (Aug. 15, 2002).
186 Id.  Temporary relief is given from the notice provision so that the breached organization, agency or individual can 
have time to evaluate the damage done by the breach and to make sure that the system is free of vulnerabilities 
before it is put back online.  Id.  Before the passage of SB 1386, companies had the option of taking their time 
investigating a breach in order to determine whether any damage occurred before they publicly disclosed the incident 
to customers.  Birnbach & Nuzum, supra note 117.
187 Poulsen, supra note 97.
188 Salkever, supra note 2 (referring to this exemption as a “loophole” that must be closed if similar legislation is 
going to be considered on a national level).
189 StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 201(o).  Contra Savage, supra note 132 (suggesting that the law probably will not 
be enforced).
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190 This assumes, of course, that contacting data subjects themselves to determine whether there has been unusual 
activity on their accounts would not be part of the investigation.  It would appear that this is something police would 
do fairly early on in any investigation.
191 Poulsen, supra note 97.
192 Birnbach & Nuzum, supra note 117.
193 Birnbach & Nuzum, supra note 117.
194 During hearings prior to the passage of SB 1386, the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) 
noted its concern that there was no cap on liability included in the bill.  August 14 Appropriations Committee 
Analysis, supra note 78.
195 It may also be difficult to show that the defendant’s breach caused the damage as opposed to some other 
method of accessing the same information.  For example, if the plaintiff’s social security number was accessed 
during the breach, it may be difficult to show that the breach of its system caused the damage, especially in light 
of the fact that millions of people in business and government have access to Social Security Numbers.  See Foley 
Testimony, supra note 28 (discussing the fact that social security numbers are accessible to a large number of 
people).
196 For example, if the breached system contained certain educational records, banking or financial information, 
medical records or other personally identifying information, there are federal laws already in place to generally 
define the parameters of the security program that must be implemented in order to protect that information. For 
example, under Graham-Leach-Bliley (GLB), the FTC is requiring that financial institutions develop a written security 
plan for safeguarding financial records.  Personal Information, supra note 119, at 6.  This “Safeguards Rule” 
will effectively require financial institutions covered by GLB to encrypt personal financial data belonging to their 
customers.  Id.
197 Absent a contract expressly delegating the risk of breach to one party or the other, breach of contract actions 
in this area will likely arise as a breach warranty claim (i.e. system security promises made at the point of data 
collection that are not kept).  Although there is little precedent to draw upon to define the exact scope of the duty 
to protect information from a computer security breach, there are some settled cases that teach valuable lessons 
in securing information.  A perfect example of such a case is In the Matter of Ziff-Davis Media, Inc., a case arising 
when Ziff Davis Media, Inc., created a web page on which consumers could submit their personal information in 
order to obtain a free short-term subscription.  In the Matter of Ziff Davis Media, Inc., Assurance of Discontinuance, 
at http://www.research.att.com/courses/nyu/b20-3156/ZDMAssurance.pdf (2002).  If customers wanted to 
subscribe beyond the free period, they could enter their credit card information.  On November 19, 2001, Ziff-Davis 
learned that the database containing this information was accessible to the general public. Id.  The database 
contained personal information on 12,000 subscribers.  Id.  Fifty of these subscribers had entered their credit card 
information into the database.  Id.   The data submitted to the web page was visible in HTML source code and was 
transmitted to Ziff Davis’ server in an unencrypted format.  Id.  The subscriber data file was actually stored on the 
same publicly accessible server as the web page in an unencrypted flat file with no authentication controls.  Id.  
After learning of the breach, Ziff-Davis deleted the data from the server, but left the promotional web page 
online.  Because of the web page design, the deleted data file was automatically recreated.  Id. at 3.  Within an 
hour, Ziff-Davis disabled the subscription web page.  Id. at 3.  The information was then moved to a more secure 
site and was encrypted.  Id.  Because it had disabled the logging function on its server, Ziff-Davis could not assess 
the extent of the intrusion or identify its cause.  Id. 
On its web site, Ziff-Davis had a privacy and security policy that promised that “reasonable precautions” 
were taken to keep disclosed personal information secure.  Id.  The states of New York, California, and Vermont 
threatened suit under their respective statutes protecting consumers from fraudulent or deceptive trade practices.  
Id. at 4.  Ziff-Davis’ potential liability stemmed mainly from its website privacy policy, which promised reasonable 
precautions would be taken to protect information collected by the site.  Brian McWilliams, Website Security Flaw 
Costs ZD, Wired News, at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,54817,00.html (Aug. 28, 2002).  
At least five of the consumers whose credit card information was stolen had fraudulent charges made to 
their accounts.  Id.  The investigation, led by the New York State Attorney General’s Office, revealed that Ziff-Davis 
failed to follow what the DA referred to as “industry standards” in the area of system security because it failed 
to encrypt or password protect the information and failed to take measures to account for whom had access to 
the information.  Id.  David Stampley, the New York assistant attorney general who handled the case, stated that 
“Acts such as failing to use SSL encryption and disabling Web server logging indicate an ongoing failure to follow 
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standard security practices.”  Id. 
The settlement included a $100,000 payment to the New York State Department of Law and $50 apiece 
to 50 customers whose credit card information had been exposed.  LaFlamme, supra note 6.  The $100,000 paid 
to the State of New York was divided amongst the three states involved in order to cover administrative costs and 
other expenses.  Website Security Flaw Costs ZD, infra.  Under part of the terms of the settlement agreement, Ziff-
Davis was required to encrypt sensitive information “during transmission from consumers”, “monitor and control 
server activity”, “review applications for security weaknesses before installation,” and “establish employee training 
and overall risk identification protocols.”  Press Release, Major Tech Publisher Reaches Agreement With Attorney 
General on E-Commerce Standards, Office of the New York State Attorney General, at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
press/2002/aug/aug28a_02.html (Aug. 28, 2002).  The settlement terms required Ziff-Davis to employ a risk-
based security program that included adherence to “standard practices relating to privacy, security, and integrity 
of Consumer data, where such standards have sufficient industry acceptance and adoption such that Ziff Davis’ 
adherence to the standards would not unreasonably place Ziff Davis at a competitive disadvantage.” Assurance of 
Discontinuance, infra, at 5 (para. 24(d)).  Ziff-Davis was also required to “store Consumer data in a database that 
cannot be meaningfully interpreted if opened as a flat plain-text file” and to “encrypt the transmission of Sensitive 
Consumer data” (as defined by the agreement).  Id.  
198 Nancy L. Ober & Dylan W. Wiseman, Theft of Computerized Personal Information Will Trigger New Notice 
Obligations for Employers Conducting Business in California, Littler Mendelson website, at http://www.littler.com/
nwsltr/asap_theft.htm (June 2003).  
199 See Coleman, supra note 46.
200 LaFlamme, supra note 6.  
201 Despite this, some organizations argue that SB 1386 is not flexible enough.  On September 16, 2002, Ken Wasch, 
the President of the Software & Information Industry Association (SIIA), sent a letter to Gray Davis, Governor of 
California, urging him to veto SB 1386. Letter from Ken Wasch, supra note 109.  In urging the veto of this bill, SIIA 
cited that prominent government groups have been unable to reach consensus on standards to be applied in the 
private sector for addressing security concerns.  Id.  SIIA argued that the FTC Advisory Committee on Online Access 
and Security found that
[A] security program should be appropriate to its circumstances.  This standard, which must 
be defined case by case, is sufficiently flexible to take into account changing security needs 
over time as well as the particular circumstances of the Web site – including the risk it faces, 
the costs of protection, and the data it must protect.
 Id.  SIIA argued that SB 1386 does not allow the flexibility companies need to determine whether a particular breach 
will pose an actual danger to the subject’s personal information.  Id.  
202 For example, as part of the implementation of Graham-Leach-Bliley (“GLB”), the FTC is requiring that financial 
institutions develop a written security plan for safeguarding financial records.  Personal Information, supra note 119, 
at 6.  This so-called “Safeguards Rule” will effectively require financial institutions covered by GLB to encrypt personal 
data belonging to their customers.  Id.
Under the Privacy Act, government contractors are treated like government agencies, which must 
establish appropriate administrative, technical and physical safeguards to insure the security and 
confidentiality of records and to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to their security 
or integrity which could result in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to 
any individual on whom information is maintained. 
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
203 Salkever, supra note 10 (noting that this law defies efforts by the Bush Administration to promote secrecy in such 
matters where information is provided to the government as part of homeland defense under the Homeland Security 
Act).
204 Poulsen, supra note 97.  The Australian Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner (OFPC) similarly encourages 
reporting of breaches as best practice, but does not require it.  Privacy and Security: Corporate Governance Issues for 
Business, SIFT Tactical Information Control, at http://www.sift.com.au/research.asp?data=0508010B4D010301070
14B7043545D4E484B5241545141565C494B (Sept. 2002).
205 In passing SB 1386, California has “bucked the trend set by President Bush’s Critical Infrastructure Team,” which 
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has leaned towards coaxing rather than forcing non-government organizations to report breaches. Laykin, supra 
note 107.
206 Patrick Thibodeau, California Leads the Way on ID Theft Legislation, COMPUTERWORLD, at http://
www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/privacy/story/0,10801,76721,00.html (Dec. 13, 2002).  This 
policy is best exemplified in the Freedom of Information Act exemption for businesses that share information with 
the government pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  See LaFlamme, supra note 6.
207 Vamosi, supra note 12.
208 Laykin, supra note 107.
209 Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act (NORPDA), S. 1350, 108th Cong. § 2(1)(A) (2003).
210 Id.  Although the term “access” is generally used to describe the process by which a user gets onto a computer 
system so he can use its files, the term technically involves “the interaction between a subject (usually a user, 
but could be a program or another IT device) and an object (such as a computer, a file or a device attached to the 
computer) that results in the flow of information from one to the other.”  ITSecurity.com, Access, COMPUTER SECURITY 
DICTIONARY, supra note 53.  
 The use of the phrase “acquisition of and access to” in reference to personal information in NORPDA is 
ambiguous.  As used in this NORPDA provision, it appears that the addition of the term “and access to” is designed 
to address situations where information is acquired during a breach of information transmitted in encrypted format 
(thus not requiring notification to data subjects), and the organization experiencing the breach later determines 
that the encrypted information has been decrypted (thus requiring notification).  If the encryption is defeated, the 
information will have been both acquired (when stolen in encrypted format) and accessed (when decrypted after 
theft).   
 The word “access” can also, however, refer to a level of activity that is something less than acquisition.  
For example, if someone bypasses the security necessary to view information, that person is said to have 
“accessed” the information.  The information has not necessarily been acquired (i.e., printed, downloaded, written 
down).  It has merely been made available to the intruder.  In NORPDA, however, “acquisition” and  “access” appear 
to be used to describe a series of events.  Because the word “acquisition” is followed by the word “access”, it 
appears that access is something that occurs after acquisition as used in this context.  It, therefore, appears that 
“access” refers to the decryption of information that was encrypted at the time of its theft.  This should be clarified 
before enactment and the word “decryption” should be used instead of “access” if that is the legislative intent. 
211 NORPDA, supra note 209.
212 Like so many other terms used in the NORPDA and SB 1386, “resident of the United States” is not defined.  
Under federal estate gift tax law, residency is determined by analyzing a group of factors that include:  (1) the 
location of real estate owned by the person; (2) the person’s purpose for currently being in the United States; and 
(3) statements the person has made in legal documents regarding his/her intent to remain in the U.S.  E.g., U.S. 
Resident Defined, EP.com, at http://www.estateprotector.com/who_needs/Non-U_S_Citizens/resident_defined.htm 
(last modified Sept. 9, 2003).  This standard is very subjective, but it certainly applies to citizens of foreign countries 
who are residing in the U.S.  
213 NORPDA, supra note 209.  “Agency,” as used in NORPDA and the Administrative Procedure Act, includes: (1) the 
Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not 
include - (A) the Congress; (B) the courts of the United States; (C) the governments of the territories or possessions 
of the United States; (D) the government of the District of Columbia; or except as to the requirements of section 
552 of this title - (E) agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives of organizations of 
the parties to the disputes determined by them; (F) courts martial and military commissions; (G) military authority 
exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory; or (H) functions conferred by sections 1738, 1739, 
1743, and 1744 of title 12; chapter 2 of title 41; subchapter II of chapter 471 of title 49; or sections 1884, 1891-
1902, and former section 1641(b)(2), of title 50, appendix.  5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2000). 
214 NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 3(a)(6))(A), (B). This appears to be much broader than the scope of persons to 
whom notice must be given under SB 1386.  Although NORPDA states in Section 3(a)(1) that notice must be given 
to “United States residents” whose personal information is reasonably believed to have been acquired, the provision 
discussing “Alternative Notification Procedures” states that, in order to avoid using NORPDA’s notice requirements, 
the agency or person must already have notification procedures in place for notifying “subject persons” of the 
breach.  Id. at 3(a)(6).  “Subject persons” is a broader category than “United States Citizens.”  Id. at § (3)(a)(6). 
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Therefore, an organization’s reasonable notification provision may have to provide for notice to all data subjects, 
including international customers.  See NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 4(a)(1))(C) (authorizing suit by State Attorneys 
General on behalf of U.S. residents).
215 NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 3(a)(7)(A).
216 NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 3(a)(7)(B).
217 According to the Commerce and Trade Privacy provisions beginning at 15 U.S.C. § 6809, a “Federal functional 
regulator” is: (A) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; (B) the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency; (C) the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; (D) the Director of the Office 
of Thrift Supervision; (E) the National Credit Union Administration Board; and (F) the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  Id. § 6809(2).
One of the regulations drafted pursuant to Health Information Protection and Portability Act (HIPAA) is 
the “Security and Electronic Signature Standards.” “The security standards require any health plan, health care 
clearinghouse, or health care provider that maintains or transmits electronic health information to assess its security 
risks and needs.  The organization must then devise, implement, and maintain appropriate security measures.  
Anyone receiving health information from them must comply with the same security standards.”  Joshua Schmidt, 
HIPAA Requires Data and Computer Security, at http://fortress.wa.gov/dshs/maa/DSHSHIPAA/attachments/pdf/
datacomputersecurity.pdf (last modified Jun. 3, 2003).  This requires health care providers to develop and implement 
administrative procedures as well as physical and technical safeguards to ensure the confidentiality of health 
information.  Id.
218 NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 3(a)(7)(C).
219 NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 3(b)(1), (c).
220 Singel, supra note 89.
221 NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 3(b)(2).
222 NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 4(a)(2)(B). Barring an emergency, the State Attorney General must first notify the 
U.S. Attorney General of his/her intent to file under NORPDA.  Id.
223 NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 4(a)(1).  As noted above, because Section 4(a)(1)(c) authorizes suit on behalf of 
U.S. residents, and not merely U.S. citizens, citizens of other countries who are residing in the U.S. may bring suit 
through the State Attorney General’s Office.  Of course, if only U.S. residents can bring suit through the state, U.S. 
citizens residing abroad could not use this enforcement method.  They would be left to pursue their remedies through 
the FTC under NORPDA § 3(a)(7))(B).  
224 NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 3(b)(3).
225 NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 5.  
226 E.g., Security Compliance, ThreatFocus, at http://www.threatfocus.com/security_laws.php (last visited Sept. 10, 
2003) (explaining NORPDA’s application of SB 1386 at the federal level); Cf. Hurley, supra note 68 (indicating that 
Feinstein’s NORPDA proposal was likely to incur opposition due to its efforts to impose the precepts of SB 1386 at 
the federal level).  
227 Matthew Heimer & Stephanie Williams, Identity Crisis, SMARTMONEY, at http://www.smartmoney.com/mag/
index.cfm?story=jan03-identity (December 17, 2002).  Thieves were able to access the database of Experian, a credit 
reporting agency, by posing as representatives of the credit department at Ford Motor Company.  Laura Guevin, 
Who’s Responsible for Protecting Our Identities, Biometritech.com, at http://www.biometritech.com/features/
laura4.htm (May 30, 2002).  There were 13,000 names in the database, including some Ford customers.  Id.  A 
Ford spokesman said that the system had not been hacked into.  Id.  He said that someone either bypassed the 
security interface or used some type of software to gain access.  Id.  When pressed for more detail on the nature of 
the break-in, the spokesman stated that the exact nature of the breach was a matter for the FBI to resolve.  Id.  Ford 
eventually notified all 13,000 consumers of the breach even though they were not all Ford customers.  Jay Lyman, 
Hackers Expose Consumer Info from Ford, Experian, News Factor Network, at http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/
story/17826.html (May 17, 2002).  The California Senate was influenced by the Ford/Experian incident and, despite 
Ford’s initial delay in reporting the incident, applauded the fact that Ford notified all persons affected as the standard 
of reporting practice it hoped to achieve in SB 1386.  Personal Information, supra note 119, at 4.
228 Heimer & Williams, supra note 227.
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229 Heimer & Williams, supra note 227.
230 Heimer & Williams, supra note 227.  Bank One now requires the disclosure of all breaches, but not many other 
financial institutions have followed its example.  Id.  
231 The Identity Theft Consumer Notification Act was originally introduced as H.R. 5474 during the 107th Congress, 
but was filed too late in the session for the House to take any action.  This same bill was refiled as H.R. 818 in 
the 108th Congress on February 13, 2003.  Identity Theft Consumer Notification Act, H.R. 818, 108th Cong. (1st 
Session 2003), available at http://www.theorator.com/bills108/hr818.html.
232 Id.
233 Id. at § 2(a)(5).  
234 Notice must be given of the “compromise of the security or confidentiality of such information, and any misuse 
of such information, that the financial institution discovers or reasonably should discover has occurred.” Id. § 
2(a)(5)(A).
235 Id. § 2(a)(5)(B).  
236 Id. § 2(a)(5)(C).  
237 Id. § 2(a)(5)(D). 
238 Id. § 618(a).
239 Id. 
240 Id. § 2(b)&(c).  
241 Salkever, supra note 10.
242 For example, employing encryption in an otherwise poorly secured environment is of little value.
243 It is not only large companies that need to review their policies.  Smaller businesses, including law firms, should 
review their security practices in light of this law.  LaFlamme, supra note 6.
244 Rubel, supra note 153.
245 Id.  This is called “logical access control.”  It is a process by which the information particular users may access is 
limited.  It can be used to control access to systems or resources, but can also be used to control the type of access 
the user will have to different parts of the system.  NIST SP 800-18, supra note 159.
246 Organizations can mitigate their risks by keeping track of the information on employees’ laptop computers.  
Without careful attention to where your data is stored, a lost laptop could require notice to all customers of a 
breach even though the laptop may have contained limited personal information. April 2003 Update, supra note 
112.
247 The law will apply if your company takes credit applications from customers and stores them on a laptop or 
a desktop.  It also applies of your company downloads credit reports or maintains employee files on its systems 
with respect to California residents.  See Posting by Site Administrator, Privacy Law Puts the Onus on Business, 
Cybernautix, Inc., at http://cybernaut.com (Mar. 18, 2003, 10:18:00 AM).
248 Messmer, supra note 91.
249 Rubel, supra note 153.
250 Ober & Wiseman, supra note 198.
251 Ober & Wiseman, supra note 198.
252 Ober & Wiseman, supra note 198.
253 Installing a firewall alone is not enough, mainly because most attacks on personal data come from inside the 
firewall or through illegitimate access to a legitimate user’s identification and authentication that allows outside 
users to go through the firewall.  StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 201(g).
254 Rubel, supra note 153.
255 Audit trails are a crucial part of any security program.  “The Audit Trail is a record of all events that take place on 
a system, and across a network.  It should provide a trace of user actions so that security events can be related to 
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the actions of a specific individual, and is therefore the basis of the accountability requirement for a secure system.”  
ITSecurity.com, Audit Trail, COMPUTER SECURITY DICTIONARY, supra note 53.
Audit trails allow an organization to record in audit logs information such as types of events, when 
the events occurred, the user ID associated with the events, and the program or command used to initiate 
the events.  Marianne Swanson, Special Publication (SP) 800-18, Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech. at 45 
(1998).  They are also useful for establishing individual accountability, reconstructing events, assisting in 
intrusion detection, and general system problem identification.  Id.  An organization’s audit trail policies, like 
all other security policies, should be reviewed for legal sufficiency by the organization’s legal counsel.  
256 Businesses may need to invest “thousands” of dollars in equipment upgrades and infrastructure to track 
intrusions.  Laykin, supra note 107.  Small to medium sized businesses may see their labor costs soar as a result of 
“24/7” tracking and monitoring the California residents’ information.  Id.
257 Randy Sabett, State of Confusion, Information Security, at http://www.infosecuritymag.com/2003/jun/
lawandregs.shtml (June 2003).
258 Savage, supra note 132 (suggesting that the law probably will not be enforced).
259 Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 5.
260 Ober & Wiseman, supra note 198.
261 Birnbach & Nuzum, supra note 117, at 6.
262 Hurley, supra note 68; see also Ober & Wiseman, supra note 198; Rubel, supra note 153.
263 Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 6 (noting that developing employee training programs, conducting 
continuous re-training, and generating written policies will go far in reducing the likelihood of consequential or 
punitive damages).
264 Ober & Wiseman, supra note 198.
265 Hulme, supra note 35.
266 Although certainly not foolproof, this may at least show that an effort was made to keep track of a data subject’s 
residency.  This type of prophylactic device may not save an organization from an adverse interpretation by a 
California court, but it may go a long way towards showing a good faith effort to keep track of data subjects who 
become California residents without the organization’s knowledge.  All customers should be required to update their 
information as a condition of the transaction because, as stated above, it is just as important to determine when 
a data subject from another state has become a resident of California as it is to establish that customers are still 
California residents for notice purposes.  
267 The California legislation may be a boon to the insurance industry, which has been waiting for the government to 
impose standards that will convince corporations that they must develop comprehensive computer security policies.  
Security: Identity Theft, supra note 151.
The rise in identity theft is resulting in two relatively new types of insurance.  One type would protect 
individuals from identity thieves by reimbursing them for many of the expenses associated with reclaiming their 
identities.  Patricia Sabatini, As Identity Theft Grows, Insurers Offer Coverage, THE ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., July 1, 2003, 
available at http://www.kmci.com/kshb/news/article/0,1925,KSHB_9418_2080641,00.html.  ID theft insurance 
generally covers costs such as “telephone calls, photocopying, notary and mailing expenses, lost wages for time away 
from work to make court dates and the like, certain attorney’s fees” and fees for future credit reports where needed 
to restore the individual’s credit history.  Id.  The cost is approximately $25 for $15,000 worth of basic coverage with 
a $100 deductible.  Id.  
Businesses are also purchasing “cyberliability” policies to protect themselves in the event of a breach.  Ilena 
Armstrong, A Risky Business, SCMAGAZINE, at http://www.scmagazine.com/scmagazine/2003_07/feature_2  (July 
2003).  Because of the uncertainty of liability in this area and the lack of actuary tables and hard data regarding 
the frequency of attacks (mainly because most go unreported), these policies are more difficult to find.  Id.  The cost 
of these policies are generally dependent on the quality of the insured’s computer security program.  Id.  Insurance 
companies will ensure that their policyholders employ sound security practices in exchange for more favorable rates.  
Varian, supra note 175.  Laws such as SB 1386 may, therefore, have the effect of driving down the cost of such 
insurance as companies report their breaches and improve their security programs.  Cliff May, Basing Cybersecurity 
Policies on Standards, SCMAGAZINE, at http://www.scmagazine.com/scmagazine/2003_07/feature_2 (July 2003); 
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see also Benjamin Wright, & Steve Haase, Legal Liability: The Computer Imperative, at http://www.pestpatrol.com/
Whitepapers/PestImperative0303.asp (July 2003).   Such insurance should only be purchased after a full cost-
benefit analysis and should be used to supplement, not replace a robust security program.  See Armstrong, supra; 
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